Abstract

In November 2014 on the Dialogic Pedagogy Journal Facebook page, there was an interesting discussion of the issue of values in dialogic pedagogy. The main issue can be characterized as the following. Should dialogic pedagogy teach values? Should it avoid teaching values? Is there some kind of a third approach? The participants of the Facebook discussions were focusing on teaching values in dialogic pedagogy and not about teaching about values. On the one hand, it seems to be impossible to avoid teaching values. However, on the other hand, shaping students in some preset molding is apparently non-dialogic and uncritical (Matusov, 2009). In the former case, successful teaching is defined by how well and deeply the students accept and commit to the taught values. In the latter case, successful dialogic teaching may be defined by students’ critical examination of their own values against alternative values in a critical dialogue. Below, Eugene Matusov and Jay Lemke, active participants of this Facebook dialogue, provide their reflection on this important issue and encourage readers to join their reflective dialogue.

Eugene Matusov, Ph.D., DPJ Editor-in-Chief, is a Professor of Education at the University of Delaware, USA. He was born in the Soviet Union. He studied developmental psychology with Soviet researchers working in the Vygotskian paradigm and worked as a schoolteacher before immigrating to the United States. He uses sociocultural and Bakhtinian dialogic approaches to education. Email: ematusov@udel.edu

Jay Lemke is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory for Comparative Human Cognition and adjunct Professor in the Department of Communication at the University of California - San Diego. He was formerly Professor at the University of Michigan School of Education and is Emeritus Professor at the City University of New York, where he was the founding Executive Officer of the PhD Program in Urban Education. He is the author of Talking Science: Language, Learning, and Values and Textual Politics: Discourse and Social Dynamics. Jay's current research concerns emotion, play, and learning. Email: lemke.jay@gmail.com

Introduction

In November 2014 on the Dialogic Pedagogy Journal Facebook page, there was an interesting discussion of the issue of values in dialogic pedagogy. The main issue can be characterized as the following. Should dialogic pedagogy teach values? Should it avoid teaching values? Is there some kind of a third approach? The participants of the Facebook discussions were focusing on teaching values in dialogic pedagogy and not about teaching about values. On the one hand, it seems to be impossible to avoid teaching values. However, on the other hand, shaping students in some preset molding is apparently non-dialogic and uncritical (Matusov, 2009). In the former case, successful teaching is defined by how well and deeply the students accept and commit to the taught values. In the latter case, successful dialogic teaching may be defined by students’ critical examination of their own values against alternative values in a critical dialogue. Below, Eugene Matusov and Jay Lemke, active participants of this Facebook dialogue, provide their reflection on this important issue and encourage readers to join their reflective dialogue.

Education as praxis of praxis

Eugene Matusov

Below I describe my particular dialogic pedagogy approach in its dialogic opposition to the two traditional approaches to teaching values. From my version of dialogic pedagogy, I assume that the overall goal of education is leisurely pursuit of critical examination of the self, the life, and the world. From this perspective all values, including and especially values on which the educational practices are based and/or to which the students subscribe, have to undergo a critical evaluation by the student.

Traditional approaches to teaching values

In my observation, there are two major traditional approaches to teaching values in education, oppositional to each other: embracing and rejecting teaching values. The first major approach is an affirmative approach to teaching values that is widespread in conventional education. It embraces teaching values by focusing on two issues. First is what kind of good social values should be preset in advance and taught (i.e., curricular standards). Second is how teachers and school should teach these values more effectively and correctly. Historically, there have been many values that conventional education has preset to teach such as: patriotism, nationalism, respect for authority, social justice, capitalism/socialism/Nazism/fascism/democracy/theocracy (depending on a country’s political and its economic regime), care of the environment, anti-racism, anti-homophobia, tolerance, respect of others, critical thinking, democracy, liberalism, diligence, reliability, entrepreneurship, honesty, sympathy for others, individualism/collectivism, autonomy, collaboration, non-conformism, teamwork, selflessness, respect for elders, and so on. Many of these values are apparently contradictory as there is often a little consensus in the society about these values. The main, but not the only, argument for this affirmative approach to teaching values is that education should help the society reproduce its own most essential and core values and practices and protect these values from deterioration or attack from inside and outside. For conventional monologic education with its focus on making students arrive at preset curricular endpoints, a set of the core societal values is just another preset curricular endpoint — an educational standard among other educational standards (e.g., epistemological, cultural). In my view, the

---


3 I’m thankful to Ana Marjanovic-Shane, Maren Aukerman, Jim Cresswell, Jay Lemke, and Mikhail Gradovski for providing their critical feedback on earlier versions of my essay as well as all participants of the Facebook discussion.
societal call for teaching values reflects the societal distrust of a “natural” and informal process of
students’ socialization and enculturation in local traditional values available to them. As the society
becomes more and more multi-communal, multi-cultural, multi-religious and liberal (i.e., tolerant to its
conflicting diversity), this distrust increases.

The second major approach is a dismissive approach to teaching values. It argues that education
has to be value-free and must focus on teaching facts to the students. Then the students can and must
make their own decisions based on these facts autonomously by themselves. This dismissive approach
distrusts values — any values — as arbitrary, unless rooted in facts and rationality, which, in essence,
replace the values as such. It places respect for an individual autonomous rational and informed authority
to make decisions on its own, regardless the societal traditions, its need to reproduce, or any other needs
outside of the universal informed rationality. A value is good not because the society is based on it or
needs it but because it can be logically and rationally deduced from the hard proven facts. Education
serves to make students autonomous rational informed agents. This vision of unbiased rational education
rejecting teaching values is rooted in Kant’s philosophy of universal rationality (and Enlightenment
Modernism, see Jay’s essay below). In my judgment, this educational approach is also monologic
because it is based on transparency and replaceability of consciousnesses and monopoly of the rational
discourse (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2015, in press-a). There can be a combination of these two
major approaches affirming teaching some kind of values (e.g., intellectual and moral) and rejecting some
others (e.g., political or religious). Now I will turn to critique of these two major traditional approaches.

Critique of teaching values

I can think of seven main arguments against teaching values. First is a political argument. As we
can see from a list of historically taught values, these values are contradictory. For example, in the
modern US society, it is possible to hear calls for teaching students respect for authority (Bennett, Finn, &
Cribb, 1999) and for teaching non-conformism (Kohn, 2014). In my view, these axiological controversies
reflect a political split in the society. In any society, even a totalitarian one, there is always a political
struggle of diverse opposing interests and diverse opposing values. Thus, teaching values in school
becomes an illegitimate political move to impose interests and values of one part of the society on the
other part of the society. This move is illegitimate because it manufactures an appearance of a consensus
where it is actually absent and abuses education by making it a mere political tool of axiological
imposition (i.e., forcing people to accept some particular values). Even more, I argue that a societal
consensus about any value is illusory because for any value there will be always a situation, in which
some part of the society will disagree, demanding opposite values, limitation of this value, or
subordination of this value to other values. This political illegitimacy of teaching values is especially true
when institutional education is funded by public taxes. Thus, taxes of a part of the society that opposes a
particular value taught in public schools are used to impose this contested value on its opposition and the
entire society. Arguably, public, state funded, education should neither promote nor suppress values,
which are legally allowed in the society, and should not become a tool of political imposition and
monopoly of values (which is somewhat similar to separation of the State and the Church in the US).
Education, at least, public education should either not be politically partisan at all or allow a political and
axiological diversity.

The second argument is logical-dialectical. Besides all values being always politically contested,
they are also always dialectically controversial. This means that the more one commits to one particular
value, the more one start enacting the opposite value because the opposite values mutually constitute
each other. For example, as Hegel convincingly showed in his essay on the master-slave relationship, a
slave’s total dedication to the master (i.e., total obedience) leads the slave to disobey the master when
the slave foresees consequences of the master’s desires as being harmful for the master himself (Hegel & Baillie, 1967). Similar, total individualism does not deny collectivity (as its oppositional value and a value among other possible values) but demands a particular collectivity that recognizes and respects individualism and, thus, limits this individualism to promote the value of individualism in the self and others. Hence, to teach values is impossible without legitimate teaching the opposite values, which dialectically constitute the primary values. Thus, to teach respect for authority well, rebellion to authority has to be taught as well. The reverse is true as well: teaching non-conformism requires teaching respect for authority. In another example, using recent educational development in the US, the “zero tolerance” (i.e., intolerance, violence) school policies are aimed at protection of tolerance and peace in school through intolerance (and institutional violence) to violators of tolerance and peace. The dialectical argument leads to a paradoxical conclusion for teaching ALL values without exception, although not necessarily in a symmetrical way.

The third argument is dialogic. A value has its meaning only in address and in response to other, alternative, values that other people have or may have. Thus, from a dialogic point of view, teaching values may involve suppressing the voices of others. Molding minds and hearts in a preset way is anti-dialogic, monologic pedagogical goal. It leads to brainwashing and extreme propaganda, which are arguably anti-educational.

The fourth argument is historical. Teaching value involves a conservative viewpoint that people in a given time and a given society want to perpetuate what they think is good for them and others. Although this desire is understandable, it is limited as it disrespects possibilities that a future generation may also come to good values, different from the current generation has. Looking back, it is clear even for the current generation that the “good” values of the past generations were quite different and at times even repelling and appalling for the current generation sensitivities (e.g., values of slavery, aristocracy, racism, homophobia, and so on). A new generation should have a right to explore alternative values that the current generation may despise. Since education is a future-oriented practice, conservatism of teaching values can be seen as anti-educational.

The fifth argument is ontological about freedom of will to make a judgment about self, life and the world. By teaching values, the society wants to make all students good: patriots, democrats, nationalists, socialists, tolerant, critical and so on in the same way as, for example, it wants all students to solve arithmetic problems correctly. I remember an important debate in one of my undergraduate classes for future teachers about whether or not a teacher is responsible if one of his or her former students has become a terrible antisocial criminal. A majority of my students thought that the teacher is always partially responsible for his/her former student’s crimes because if the teacher taught really well this student, he or she would not become a criminal. In my view, this reveals the Enlightenment Modernist belief that all vices are rooted in ignorance and the societal order for education to make students good people predictably and deterministically. According to this belief, a failure to do so is the teacher’s flaw. A minority of my students and I respectfully disagreed. My disagreement is based not so much on impossibility of such goal, although it is true as well, but on undesirability of this pedagogical goal. Making students “good people” predictably by education robs these students from their freedom and responsibility for their own deeds. Paradoxically, people who do predictably “good things” without choosing these things freely are not free and, arguably, are not good. Goodness is rooted not in the act or behavior but in a person’s free choice for a good act or behavior with consideration of all other, presumably bad, choices. Freedom is impossible without a possibility for abuse of this freedom. Thus, good education can produce evil scientists, evil politicians, and evil people in general and I’m OK with that! In theological discussions, even God couldn’t (or should not?) make all people good and I think it is great that God couldn’t.
Responsibility for our own deeds implies a possibility of being evil for us. I argue that without our free will, involving a choice to be evil, with or without excellent education, we cannot be human. Education is not about molding people in some preset form of goodness but critical consideration of what constitutes “good” in each particular case against all other possible values in a critical dialogue. In the 20th century, the idea of molding people into “good citizens” through education led to genocide of concentration death camps that were called “re-education” (e.g., in the Stalinist Soviet Union, Maoist Communist China, Nazi Germany). Goodness is a self-reflective notion, which means that goodness involves constant deciding what good is in each particular case and deed — it does not pre-exist the deed and the particular situation. This is what Aristotle (2000) called praxis, in contrast to poiesis. In praxis, the values emerge in the activity itself, while in poiesis the values pre-exist the activity. The affirmative teaching values approach is poiesis-based. From an ontological point of view, it robs students from learning how to generate and judge values by themselves and, thus, ironically, this approach is arguably anti-value, anti-axiological. Teaching values becomes destruction of values. Students become either slaves of the taught values (i.e., uncritical acceptance of the values), indifferent to these values (i.e., uncritical neglect of the values), or rebels of the taught values (i.e., uncritical rejection of values). Anything else — i.e., critical acceptance of taught values or critical rejection of the taught values — requires legitimation of alternative values.

The sixth argument is liberal and specific for liberal societies. Liberalism accepts plurality of diverse and even opposing values, including even illiberal values. However, teaching a particular set of values — however good intentions of the educators and the society are — is illiberal. It makes education an illiberal practice contradicting the spirit of liberal society. Although, it is true that any liberal society sets limitations for its liberalism to protect itself from illiberal communities that may try to take over the society and establish an illiberal regime; it is not clear why education has to join this defensive police role and completely sacrifice its own mission for it.

The seventh argument is internally educational. Despite the fact that the society at large may have an important and legitimate desire to impose some values on the entire society as it is often done through law and law enforcement agencies, as I said before, it is not clear why education should be subordinated to and sacrificed for this goal. In the history of institutionalized education, there has been a strong trend to assign non-educational goals to education. Such non-educational goals have historically involved: eradicating economic inequality, getting ahead of international economic competition, promoting national security, keeping minors off the streets, child care while parents work, keeping minors from a labor market in competition with adults, providing social cohesion in the society, addressing racial and economic (de)segregation, contributing to economic reproduction, getting professional training, providing personal income, contributing to economic welfare of the society, developing political competence, promoting political and national loyalty, building the nation, spreading the quality of healthcare, and so on. I have several challenging questions about assigning societal goals to education. Can these goals be achieved through education: is it partially or fully possible? My answer is mostly no (although occasionally there can be some synergy of non-educational and educational goals or at least minimum harm to inherently educational goals). I think that the Enlightenment, Modernist, dream that all societal ills are exist the activity. The affirmative teaching values approach is poiesis-based. From an ontological point of view, it robs students from learning how to generate and judge values by themselves and, thus, ironically, this approach is arguably anti-value, anti-axiological. Teaching values becomes destruction of values. Students become either slaves of the taught values (i.e., uncritical acceptance of the values), indifferent to these values (i.e., uncritical neglect of the values), or rebels of the taught values (i.e., uncritical rejection of values). Anything else — i.e., critical acceptance of taught values or critical rejection of the taught values — requires legitimation of alternative values.

The sixth argument is liberal and specific for liberal societies. Liberalism accepts plurality of diverse and even opposing values, including even illiberal values. However, teaching a particular set of values — however good intentions of the educators and the society are — is illiberal. It makes education an illiberal practice contradicting the spirit of liberal society. Although, it is true that any liberal society sets limitations for its liberalism to protect itself from illiberal communities that may try to take over the society and establish an illiberal regime; it is not clear why education has to join this defensive police role and completely sacrifice its own mission for it.

The seventh argument is internally educational. Despite the fact that the society at large may have an important and legitimate desire to impose some values on the entire society as it is often done through law and law enforcement agencies, as I said before, it is not clear why education should be subordinated to and sacrificed for this goal. In the history of institutionalized education, there has been a strong trend to assign non-educational goals to education. Such non-educational goals have historically involved: eradicating economic inequality, getting ahead of international economic competition, promoting national security, keeping minors off the streets, child care while parents work, keeping minors from a labor market in competition with adults, providing social cohesion in the society, addressing racial and economic (de)segregation, contributing to economic reproduction, getting professional training, providing personal income, contributing to economic welfare of the society, developing political competence, promoting political and national loyalty, building the nation, spreading the quality of healthcare, and so on. I have several challenging questions about assigning societal goals to education. Can these goals be achieved through education: is it partially or fully possible? My answer is mostly no (although occasionally there can be some synergy of non-educational and educational goals or at least minimum harm to inherently educational goals). I think that the Enlightenment, Modernist, dream that all societal ills are exist the activity. The affirmative teaching values approach is poiesis-based. From an ontological point of view, it robs students from learning how to generate and judge values by themselves and, thus, ironically, this approach is arguably anti-value, anti-axiological. Teaching values becomes destruction of values. Students become either slaves of the taught values (i.e., uncritical acceptance of the values), indifferent to these values (i.e., uncritical neglect of the values), or rebels of the taught values (i.e., uncritical rejection of values). Anything else — i.e., critical acceptance of taught values or critical rejection of the taught values — requires legitimation of alternative values.
example, I'm against prioritization of social justice in education. Even more, my analysis of this phenomenon (2009, ch. 4, analyzing Paolo Freire's "pedagogy of oppressed" that prioritizes social justice) shows that prioritization of social justice in education unavoidably leads to totalitarianism (despite the designers’ claims of the contrary) because educators have preset ideas how social justice looks like. In my book, I argue that social justice should be subordinated to “internally persuasive discourse” (IPD, Bakhtin, 1991) – critical examination of the self, life, and the world in a public discourse, i.e., education in my version. Humanity is rooted in IPD and NOT in pursuit of social justice outside of IPD. The tragedies and crimes made in the name of social justice -- by Communism, Fascism, and Fundamentalist Totalitarian Islam, to name a few -- show that the prioritization of social justice over IPD unavoidably leads to totalitarianism, genocide, and societal suicide.

In sum, teaching values leads to monologic imposition of values, their uncritical acceptance or rejection of these values, conservatism, anti-liberalism (i.e., intolerance to diversity and opposition), dogmatism, and anti-education.

Critique of unbiased, value-free, objective rational education

Now let me turn to my critique of the teaching value dismissive approach that argues for teaching hard facts and rationality instead of values.

My first argument is philosophical. Life distinguishes itself from non-life by an organism having values and biases. Any living organism, even biologically very primitive one, has three major biases: attraction, repulsion, and neutrality. Dead or non-living objects do not have biases remaining indifferent. Objectivity is a metaphor. At its best, it is a call for a justification of values and biases. At its worst, it is an illusion or manipulation of power. All values are subjective. They define our subjectivity — our subjective, living, relationship and attitude to the world. Being alive and being in the world is to be subjectively biased. Thus, value-free, objective, education is impossible (or suicidal).

My second argument is practice-based. Any particular practice is value-based. Any particular educational practice is value-based. For example, the value-free objectivist educational approach values rationalism (and rational discourse), logic, autonomy, evidence (hard proven), consensus, transparency of consciousness, proof, rational testing ideas, objectivity, valuelessness, and so on. It is not difficult to show from philosophical, dialectical, dialogic, mathematical, and historical arguments and vistas that its rationalism is irrational, meaning that the rationalism is either circular or deeply down justified by non-rational arguments, cf. famous Kurt Gödel's incompleteness theorems⁴ (Hofstadter, 1999). Any pedagogical approach has its particular values that the teacher cannot escape (or be rationally proven, based on logic and evidence). On the top of that, the pedagogical practice is not only shaped by the teacher but also by other direct and indirect participants, players, and institutions including students, parents, school administrators, local school board members, politicians, taxpayers, and so on and shaped by circumstances. All pedagogical practices are full of values and cannot be above values. A process of socialization and enculturation in particular values is unavoidable in any practice. In education, students unavoidably socialize in pedagogical values: what is considered and counts as education, learning, and teaching. This socialization does not necessary involve only acceptance of the particular pedagogical values but also their rejection. What pure socialization and enculturation, without critical reflection, makes difficult is learning about existing and/or possible alternatives, making the participants entrapped by the socialized values. Objectivist and rationalist approach to education smuggles its pedagogical and

⁴ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_theorems
philosophical values in its approach and, thus, tries to teach these values covertly. Value of objectivism and rationalism is a hidden curriculum of the value-free pedagogy.

My third argument is evaluative. Not only any practice, including educational one, is charged with values but also the participants constantly take an evaluative stand toward these values: are these values emergent in the practice as good or bad. The objectivist approach tries to replace axiology with rationalism but as I argued above, that is impossible. Subjective values penetrate not only their practice but also the process of evaluation of the practice’s values itself.

My fourth argument is ethical. Any practice involves ethical tensions among its participants. Resolution of these ethical tensions is guided and evaluated by the participants’ values. What is fair or unfair in treating each other and especially the students by the teacher is defined heavily, but not exclusively, by the teachers’ values. Through this process of ethical tensions and, at times, conflicts, the participants unavoidably (but in an unpredicted way) socialize in each other values.

My fifth argument is communal and political. The community life involves decision making about the community. Who and how makes these decisions, how to resolve disagreements, and who and how decides how to make these decisions and change the decision-making process is a political and communal process unavoidably based on values. In a rationalistic learning community, political decision-making remains authoritarian masquerading as rational.

In sum, values are unavoidable in any practice, including in education. Any attempt to make education value-free does not eliminate the dependence on values but rather it masks and hides values to make them difficult to critique and analyze. Thus, I conclude that this “value free”, rationalist approach is also monologic and anti-educational.

**Critical examination of values: praxis of praxis**

My educational value defines my vision of education is critical examination of life, self and the world. In my view, education is not about transmission of values, including my own educational value that I have just spelled out. Education is total critical examination, including education itself and its own values. The Enlightenment goal of making people good is not a legitimate goal of education (and, fortunately, it is not possible anyway). Values as virtues, accepted norms, traditions, habits, desires, or tastes can reach their human potentials only in a critical dialogue. In themselves, values have the dialogic nature as they have to be filled with meaning, understood, evaluated, justified, responded, and be taken with responsibility, against alternative meanings, understandings, values, justifications, voices, and responsibilities. I see the main challenge of a dialogic pedagogy in its accepting unavoidability of imposition of particular values in education while opening them up for transformation, liberalism (i.e., tolerance to diversity and opposition), and open-ended critique. I think that this challenge can be addressed through the following three principles: 1) critical dialogism (i.e., internally persuasive discourse), 2) axiological dualism, 3) setting boundaries of education (i.e., Critical Dialogic Postmodernism).

**Internally persuasive discourse**

Bakhtin (1991) coined the notion of “the internally persuasive discourse” (IPD) in his opposition to “the authoritative discourse” (AD) to contrast a discursive process of free persuasion versus a discourse process of imposition and coercion. There have been different interpretations among educationalists of what IPD exactly means. Specifically, what “internal” means in “the internally persuasive discourse”? “Internal” to what? Some educationalists assume that “internal” defines the
individual, the psychological, internal to the individual: the individual's cognition and psyche (see many examples of this interpretations here, in Ball & Freedman, 2004). In this interpretation, the most salient characteristic of IPD is that its demand for and recognition of the autonomous individual. In contrast, my colleague and I (Matusov & von Duyke, 2010) argue that “internal” defines the discourse itself, internal to the discourse, — both localized in time, space, and among the immediate participants and distributed in time, space, and among diverse remote participants. In our interpretation, the most salient characteristic of IPD is that it is dialogically critical and critically dialogic. This means that any critique (e.g., of values) should be embedded in a never-ending public, interpersonal and intrapersonal, historical dialogue. Also, any of such dialogue has to challenge any opinions, positions, paradigms, worldviews, and values. As Morson (2004) characterizes IPD similar to our interpretation, in IPD “Truth becomes dialogically tested and forever testable” (p. 319). Paraphrasing Morson’s statement about truth in IPD for values, we can state, “In IPD, values become dialogically tested and forever testable.”

Based on my pedagogical practice, I see three types of values in education: 1) discussed values — educational and non-educational values that are brought for public forum among students and the teachers5 (and beyond them), 2) espoused values — values that the participants claim as their own ones aimed to guide their practices and deeds inside and outside of education, and 3) in-action values — values that emerge and actually guide their actions and deeds inside and outside of education. I argue that all these three types of values have to be a part of IPD testing. Dialogic IPD testing of values both involves and extends “self-contained rationality” (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2015, in press-b). Marjanovic-Shane and I define “self-contained rationality” as a self-contained discourse limited by the universal logic and the consideration of relations in one sphere at expense of all others. We contrast self-contained rationality with dialogic testing where “…what has been tacitly naturalized in self-contained rationality of one paradigm becomes problematized, replied, and, thus, relativized (‘ratio’ — brought in the relationship with an alien other)….“ Dialogic testing involves “diverse spheres of life, diverse opaque consciousnesses, and personal mediated or unmediated biases — rational or not — come together in a dramatic tension of critical deconstruction of values and power relations through dialogue. We believe that an unmediated personal bias — an initial personal emotional relationship of attraction, repulsion, disorientation, or indifference — is the basis of any rationality. However, we think that only public critical dialogue can justify rationality and point at its limits.”

Of course, education defined as the IPD — critical examination of the self, the life, and the world (and values) — is a value in itself promoted and imposed on the students by dialogically minded educators. However, rather than simply socializing students in this value, dialogic pedagogy should engage this value in the IPD itself. For example, in one of my classes on cultural diversity in education for future teachers my students discuss three axiological approaches to multiculturalism: educationally conservative, progressive and radical (Liston & Zeichner, 1996). After considering PROs and CONs of each approach, I asked the students to develop “formulæ” their preferable multicultural approaches for their learning (i.e., being a student) and their teaching (i.e., being a future teacher) and justify their approaches (the students could mix the 3 approaches with some weights in their formulæ). Between mostly “conservative” students, insisting on transmission of non-problematic hard facts, and mostly “progressive-radical” students, insisting on attending to students’ interests and painful problems of the society, emerged polemics. At some point of the polemics, a “radical” student accused “conservative” peers in a hypocrisy, “Look, you want to transmit your future students hard, non-controversial facts, but admit that you enjoy discussions in our class. If Eugene did not have ‘progressive-radical’ pedagogy, we won’t have these discussions and you’d have forced to learn his facts. I think you’d have been the first

5 There is nothing wrong for a teacher to share her/his values with the students in dialogic pedagogy, IF the teacher is not aimed at making the students to accept them. Teacher's values are just some particular values among other values worth of investigation.
who complained that the class was boring and sucked! Admit it, admit!” The “conservative” students laughed and agreed but they counter-argued that teaching adult undergraduate students, who pay for their education, like them, is different than teaching their future elementary school students, young children, who do not have good discussion skills yet and must succeed on standardized tests. Our critical discussion continued. In my view, the “radical” and “conservative” students engaged the class in ontological dialogic testing of values based on reflective consideration of their own experiences of our dialogic class in relationship with their espoused ideas and values. Currently, I am engaging my students in critical reflecting on the class in every class meeting and in making suggestions for its improvement. Eventually, we make collective decisions about changing our class and about how to make the decision through in class and online voting and a Town Hall class meeting.

My colleague Marjanovic-Shane and I argue that educational practice should not just be viewed as *praxis* (in contrast to *poësis*), where values, qualities, and goals emerge in the practice itself and not preset but also it should be viewed as *praxis of praxis* (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2012). In *praxis of praxis*, students should be engaged in critical defining and evaluating their own education. They should critically evaluate their own desires, values, and beliefs about their own education. They should test desirability of their own educational values and values of the educational practice, in which they are involved. No stone should be unturned in this critical examination of the educational practice and their own and the teachers’ values. This process can be possible only when the students express, and are exposed to, and, at times, experience educational values alternative to their own dear values and the values of the educational practice. For example, at the beginning of some of my classes, I often share one of my teaching dilemma: should I call on the students only when they raise their hand or should I also randomly pick up on students, who do not raise their hand? After considering other alternative ideas and their PROs and CONs, we usually vote for one among several alternatives that we generate (about 8-10). In one of my classes, a high majority of the students voted for the former option of me calling only on students who raise their hand. They prioritized the value of their own comfort over the quality of our learning discourse and their own learning how to participate in it. However, in a few weeks many students in this class started complaining that there had emerged a small group of talkative students and a silent majority. After this ontological experience, we returned back to a discussion of alternative options and voting. This time we selected “the 5th Amendment” option: I, as their teacher, had a right to call randomly on a student who does not raise his/her hand but the student has right to “remain silent” (like in the US Constitution, 5th amendment) by saying “pass” without any explanation (cf. Shor, 1996). In a few weeks, we reflected that almost all students spoke up in the class and more students felt comfortable raising their hands. Of course, not all values are always visible to their participants but this fact should not discourage dialogic educators from the process of critical examination of the values underlining the educational practice.

Axiological dualism

Dialogism leads to axiological dualism. In a dialogical Bakhtinian approach, alternative and even opposing ideas and values involve meaning making of these ideas or values. An idea is meaningful only in response and address to an alternative idea or value. Thus, in dialogism, not only a particular value is put forward but also alternative values are appreciated, although not at the same way as the aspired particular value. The alternative ideas are dialogically and agonistically appreciated because they provide necessary boundaries and perspectives of the idea/value that became valued as a part of THE truth and meaning (partisan-visionary approach) – because then, such perceived truth has a perspective and stands (paradoxically) stronger (has more power!) (Marjanovic-Shane, personal communication, January 26, 2015). In our radical proposal for education based on the State’s Educational Neutrality, Marjanovic-Shane and I (2011) have introduced this axiological dualism rooted in the Bakhtinian dialogism. We have
defined first type of values as “partisan-visionary” while the second type of values as “relationship-power”. The partisan-visionary values may include particular educational philosophies defining educational actions and their goals such as conventional transmission of knowledge, constructivism, progressivism, democratic education (e.g., Summerhill school), dialogic pedagogy, and so on. The relationship-power values involve particular power relationships with alternative and competing partisan-visionary values and can involve such values as: exclusive monopoly, intolerance, pluralism, polyphony, competition, and so on. In our proposal, we argue that these two types of values constitute axiological “dimensions” of educational philosophies. The problem with the term “dimension” is dimensions imply the orthogonal relations among the factors, being indifferent and not affecting each other. In contrast, the relationship between the partisan-visionary and relationship-power types of values is dualistic, often (but not always) involving synergetic or oppositional relations at times. Thus, in contrast to visionary dialogic pedagogy, pluralistic dialogic pedagogy has to tolerate and appreciate monologic or even anti-dialogic values. In practice, a pluralistically dialogic teacher has to tolerate and appreciate (if not even support) students with monologic and anti-dialogic values. Where if not in education, however marginal, offensive, and extreme, be legitimately and critically examined through a learning safety of a public forum?!

In my book (Matusov, 2009), I discussed a case where I was guiding my undergraduate student, future teacher, working on her final project while our values collided. As a highly religious Protestant Christian, she tried to advocate for teaching intelligent design in public schools in her learning project. I, religiously indifferent, was guiding her to finding diverse voices on the Internet (e.g., differently minded Protestants, Catholics, Buddhists, Jews, atheists, agnostics, religiously indifferent, constitutional lawyers, evolutionary biologists) to address and respond to their concerns about her proposal. Fortunately, she accepted my overall guidance (but not every aspect of it) and got excited in trying to reply to alternative concerns and values. In her final draft, she came to a conclusion that she needed to teach in a private religious school or to engage herself in a political fight for changing the US laws and the Constitution. She considered but rejected the tempting idea of smuggling teaching intelligent design, her own dear religious truth, in a public school because it was illegal and dishonest approach, in her view. I was able to provide my pluralistic dialogic guidance through her recursive revisions and my feedback despite our axiological discord. In my judgment, the student became informed and educated about her own values and educational issues related to them and deepened her understanding of biology, evolution, and her own religious beliefs.

Dialogic pluralism demands dialogic testing values not only purely intellectually but often also ontologically. Students should have an opportunity to try out their actions guided by alternative, even monologic and anti-dialogic, values. Students should be encouraged by pluralistic dialogic teachers in active exploration of their educational values by trying them out, experiencing them, and critically reflecting about these experiences in a public forum. In the past, I had students who insisted on learning through transmission of rigidly designed curriculum by me and I followed this desire. Often they demanded the same regime for the rest of the class. I agreed to follow this idea only if these students would convince the rest of the class to accept this pedagogical design. For some interesting reason, so far, this made these students to abandon the demand of transmission of knowledge. When students reject my dialogic guidance, I respect their rejection and ask them to justify their rejection and reveal their educational values. Thus, a pluralistic dialogic approach always remains axiological hybrid of mixture of many values.
One may object that despite me trying to be pluralistic dialogic teacher, I impose my pluralistic dialogism on my students through the practices described above. Is it not cunning and hidden socialization-enculturation of my students into dialogic pedagogy and its values? Yes, I have to admit that this critique is a fair description in what I am trying to do. It is true that any particular educational practice unavoidably socializes students in certain values by just the very fact of its own practice and culture. Any practice requires building its own culture, its own community, its own norms, and its own socialization-enculturation. My pluralistic dialogic pedagogy is not an exception. An interesting issue is how much students should co-participate in design and transformation of the educational culture. In a conventional pedagogy, the responsibility for the pedagogical culture is mostly designed and maintained by the teacher. I argue that in dialogic pedagogy it has to be, in some way, democratic (but not necessarily collaborative as democracy involves legitimate agonistic and even antagonistic relations). The question emerges what role this educational culture and its particular values should have in the educational process in dialogic pedagogy.

Some of dialogic pedagogy colleagues argue that there is the core cultural values—tolerance, anti-racism, anti-homophobia, anti-sexism and so on—that should be taught the students in dialogic pedagogy, as citizens and professionals, we have a collective stake in what that culture is—both locally in any classroom/school environment and as a nation with citizens. I respectfully disagree because some participants can desire not to be a part of any manufactured “we”. Whose values are we talking about? This is where “we-discourse” (i.e., “our values”, “societal values”, “human values”, “state values”, “values of good people”) creates illegitimate hegemonies and makes it difficult to challenge them, in my view. I suspect any “we” that is forcefully imposed on me. I suspect any forced collectivism and forced collectivity, however good it may sound. However, I am not afraid of freely chosen “we” and collectivity, or collectivity that can be freely tried and freely left (Kukathas, 2003). I prefer being asked first if I feel or want to be a part of any “we” and consider alternative “we”. I do not assume or desire that my students must be part of my “we”, however good I see this “we”. Of course, I have values, commitments, and stakes in many endeavors but again I do not assume that my students must have the same values, commitments, and stakes, however good I see them. I see education as helping students to decide what good is for them and why. I can share my stakes, values, and so on with my students and explain why I like them but I want my students treat my values as an option of their critical consideration among other alternative options.

In my view, it is not goal of education to socialize students in any particular values, even if this socialization is unavoidable, but rather to confront them for a critical investigation. In this sense, education is ANTI-enculturation, ANTI-culture, and ANTI-socialization. Education is a spoilsport (Marjanovic-Shane, 2015, in preparation). It is very annoying, rebelling, disagreeing, and disruptive. Education unavoidably builds some particular culture but it should aim at undermining, if not destroying, its own culture as well (at least as uncritically immediate, “natural”). My pedagogical goal is not to try to avoid value impositions but to make them the object of my students’ reflection and critique through the IPD. I want to turn teaching values (through socialization-enculturation) into teaching ABOUT values—through critical testing of these values and other alternatives (Marjanovic-Shane, personal communication, January 26, 2015). I want to choose such values in my pedagogy that enable my students’ critical evaluation of these and other values (and my own pedagogical desires that start with “I want”). Imposition of values is unavoidable, but there exists an option for their critical examination — the option that my pluralistic dialogic approach embraces. Thus, for example, in my classes we often critically discuss whether Socratic definition of education as “an unexamined life is not worth living”, which is very close to my own definition of education, should be contested: can an unexamined life be worth living, and can an examined life be not worth living (Kukathas, 2001, 2003)?

Values in dialogic pedagogy
Eugene Matusov and Jay lemke
Or, to take a less trivial case, a Muslim fisherman in Kelantan may not have a basic interest in being able to revise his ends. He has been a Muslim since birth, takes his religion on faith and believes its commands oblige him to pray five times daily, to abstain from alcohol, and various forbidden foods and practices, to regard Mohammed as God's prophet, and to view apostasy as a sin. He is unlikely to be able 'rationally to assess his ends' since there is no opportunity to do so: he is, if literate, not well-read outside the Quran; he has little knowledge of the world—even of the Islamic world—beyond his own locality; indeed, he has little ability to explore his own religious tradition to judge which parts are 'worthy of [his continued] allegiance'. Yet he may live a life he considers, and even we might recognize as, good. Although not wealthy, he may live a life which is physically comfortable, enjoy the love and affection of his family and friends, be able to take pride in his skills and satisfaction from success in providing for his children; and he may be able to find in his religion explanations which not only account for his place in the order of things but also give meaning to his life. Why should he, or we, think he has any kind of interest (let alone a more fundamental interest) in being able rationally to assess and revise his conception of the good? In this case it might even make more sense to say that he has an interest in being able to insulate himself from influences which could damage his world-view. And in practice, individuals and societies do attempt to do this—sometimes deliberately. Odysseus had himself bound to the mast so that, when he heard the song of the sirens, he would not be tempted to revise his ends (and swim to his death); equally importantly, he had his crew block their ears with wax so that they too would not be tempted to revise their ends, and he instructed them not to obey him when he was spellbound. The critical point here is that the unexamined life may well be worth living (Kukathas, 2001).

And if it is worth living unexamined, there is no reason to think that our interests are necessarily served by our having the opportunity to examine and revise it. Nor, of course, is there reason to think that it is necessarily against our interests to have such opportunities (Kukathas, 2003, p. 59).

By saying that education is rebellious and destructive by its very nature, I do not mean to say that any rebellions and every destruction are educational, not at all. Recently, Alfie Kohn (2014) articulates an apparently similar idea by calling for "raising critical rebels", "Encourage young people to focus on the needs and rights of others, to examine the practices and institutions that get in the way of making everyone's lives better, to summon the courage to question what one is told and be willing to break the rules sometimes.... One should be 'critical' in both senses of that word: willing to find fault but also dependent on careful analysis. It's not 'If you say yes, I'll say no,' but rather 'If you say or do something that doesn't make sense, I'll ask why—then, if necessary, say no (and suggest that other people do the same).’” In my view, pluralistic dialogic pedagogy calls for responsibility rather than abdicate it. However, this call is not absolute either as education is willing to investigate irresponsibility, as its alternative possibility as well.

Whose and what values can legitimately shape education?

Since imposition of certain values is unavoidable in education, a question of legitimacy and illegitimacy of some axiological impositions have to be considered. In my view, the public has a compelling and legitimate interest in promoting a universal opportunity for education. This public interest is both existential and instrumental. The existential public interest is about giving an opportunity for critical self-actualization for all as an unalienated right. The instrumental interest can be economic, political, national, and social — this is how public interest in education is often discussed. Currently, it is a common belief around the globe that just because the public has a legitimate interest in education, it is necessarily means that the public, through its national and local government, has a legitimate right to shape the education: to define its curriculum, instruction, assessment, and organization. In contrast, my colleague Marjanovic-Shane and I (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2011) disagree. We argue that there is the public
interest in promoting private, not public, education. We argue that any education is essentially private and has to be recognized as such, from a point of view of values. By "private", we do not mean the source of funding or the nature of educational providers. Rather, it is private in an axiological pedagogical sense that any education is autodidact and authorial — personal and unique self-education. It is the role of the State to provide resources for such education for all. We argue that the public does not have a legitimate right to shape education and define it is curriculum, instruction, assessment, and organization. While providing funding for educational resources for all through public taxation, the State must declare the educational neutrality regarding educational values, permitted by the law. The State may also have legitimate rights to regulate educational practices such as preventing and punishing of possible abuses: sexual abuses, financial abuses, misleading advertisement by educational providers, not delivering promised services, and so on within this educational neutrality. In addition, the State has the legitimate right of self-protection, limiting educational freedoms at times. As I argued above, definitely, the principle, "he who pays the piper calls the tune" is a wrong justification for the State to shape legitimately publically (through taxing people of different creeds and values) funded schools and education in general.

Currently there are concentric circles of power shaping educational values. Across the globe, with the relatively recent exception of the US, on the top of this hierarchical power pyramid is the national state government, then the local government, then the educational institution, then teachers, and finally at the bottom are parents of young students and, for adults, students themselves. However, in our view, on the top of the power pyramid shaping educational values must be the student (mediated by guardians for very young or severely mentally challenged students) followed by the student's teachers (and other educational providers). I do not see legitimacy of anybody else shaping educational values for individual students.

Another issue is what particular values shape education. Currently, curriculum, instruction, assessment, and organization of education are defined by powerful others for the student. For many—many forming years, students must be engaged in values, activities, communication, and norms defined and constrained by other people. These pedagogical activities often have intrinsic values neither for the students nor for anybody else, constituting alienation and boredom and inhibiting students' ownership for their own education and life (Nilsson & Wihlborg, 2011; Sidorkin, 2002). To keep these academic pedagogical impositions, conventional schools create a pedagogical regime of survival for the students (and sometimes even for the teachers), often making students feel overwhelmed and burden with their academic life, being happy when the school and education are over.

I argue that curriculum, instruction, assessment, and organization of education have to be defined by the students themselves with help of their teachers. The student-teacher relationship is sacred and intimate with the primacy for the student, similar to the patient-doctor or client-lawyer relationships. Teacher exists for the student — facilitation of the student's autodidact educational process and not the other way around. In dialogic pedagogy, I see the overall goal of education in leisurely pursuit of critical examination of the life, the self, and the world. The student should be able to bring whatever values they subscribe to and are familiar with to education for their critical examination freely and safely. In addition, educational time should be entirely defined by the student, free from any survival burden, any assignment by others, or any social stigma (Greenberg, 1992; Llewellyn, 1998; Neill, 1960).

Testing boundaries of the pluralistic dialogic approach

Like any approach, our praxis of praxis pluralistic dialogic approach has its own limitations that are important to discuss. So far, I have heard four major objections against the pluralistic dialogic approach described above. The first objection is about having students who, because of their values, are
not suitable for the aspired profession. Thus, for example, my colleague, teacher educator, Scott Richardson wrote on his Facebook page, “Wonderment: Which is worse (as I grade papers and watch the news on Eric Garner) that we allow racists to become teachers or police?” (December 3rd, 2014, https://www.facebook.com/scott.richardson.9250/posts/10204842806606550). I think it is NOT a business of teachers to be gatekeepers for their students. I think that any summative assessment, sorting people on those who will get some social goodies and on those who will not (e.g., grading), betrays the student-teacher relations and thus is anti-educational. In my view, any mistake in the context of education is a learning-teaching opportunity and never should be taken against the student as it is done in a summative assessment. Education should be a safe learning environment. It is not the role of the teacher to decide to who deserve to be a teacher, or a politician, or a doctor, or a lawyer and who does not, even if a teacher thinks that his/her student is a racist or an incompetent or a bad person. I think many lawyers may feel more than uncomfortable to defend, counsel, and represent some of their clients but they find compelling professionally to do so DESPITE how they feel and judge them. I suspect that we, educators, have a similar professional obligation and cannot be legitimately gatekeepers for our students. Of course, as human beings, both lawyers and teachers may have limitations of how much their own despise they can tolerate directed against their clients or students. But if their sense of repelling becomes intervening with their professional practice, they should excuse themselves from either legal representation of this particular client or teaching this particular student. On the other hand, it does not mean that gatekeeping of weeding out unprofessional, incompetent and ill-minded participants is bad or unnecessary -- it just should be done outside of education, in my view. The legitimate gatekeeper role may belong to the managers of the targeted practice. For the teachers, gatekeeping and sorting their students is a conflict of interests that the teachers should try to avoid. Education has to be a safe place for learning where students can reveal and discuss their values that others may find objectionable or even offensive.

Second, what if teachers and students’ values make other students uncomfortable, offended, or even harmed? Since I believe that education inherently involves of a discomfort through challenge and unfamiliarity as its inherent curriculum, I focus my discussion here on consideration of offense and harm rather on frustration and discomfort. In general, I think that protection of students against harm should be prioritized over their education. For example, in one of my classes on dialogic pedagogy, I planned to show a fragment from a Japanese movie involving a reference to rape (not a graphic scene) to discuss how a voice of a person gets silenced or promoted. A female student traumatized by rape in her past asked to be excused from watching this video clip. She agreed that the watching this video was very important for our class discussion of the topic at hand but she could not stand even slightest mentioning rape. In my judgment, her well-being was more important than her education.

Even a bigger teaching dilemma may involve inter-students conflict concerning values. I had a class while teaching in California, in which a Mexican-American Aztec-descent student considered all White American people (with surprising exception of me, maybe because I am an immigrant in the US) as enemies of Native Americans to be physically fought out, if not eliminated, from the two American continents. In the class, majority of the students were White Caucasian with a rather visible and vocal minority of Latino/a students (mostly Mexican decent but not necessary Native Americans). My teaching assistant was a Mayan Guatemalan graduate student. In my observation and judgment, the Aztec student

---

6 “On July 17, 2014, Eric Garner died in Staten Island, New York, after a police officer put him in a chokehold. The New York City Medical Examiner’s Office concluded that Garner died partly as a result of the chokehold. New York City Police Department (NYPD) policy prohibits the use of chokeholds, and law enforcement personnel contend that it was a headlock and that no choking took place. On December 3, 2014, a grand jury decided not to indict Pantaleo. The event stirred public protests and rallies with charges of police brutality. As of December 28, 2014, at least 50 demonstrations had been held nationwide specifically for Garner while hundreds of demonstrations against general police brutality counted Garner as a focal point. The Justice Department announced an independent federal investigation.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death_of_Eric_Garner
unfairly attacked White students both as a social group and personally. For example, the Aztec student made a rather mean and ill-hearted remark when an older White European-descent student revealed in the class that her daughter committed suicide. I tried to talk privately and in class with him. Among other things, we discussed that there is no such thing as historically innocent ethnicity — revealing among other historical facts, a rather oppressive past of the Aztec Empire based on slavery and enslaving some Mayan tribes (evidently, the Aztec student did not know that). However, it did not help as the student acclaimed to be a Native American radical nationalist aiming to liberate Americas from White Caucasian people. At some point, I considered expelling him from my class but the rest of the students and especially the older White student asked me not to do that. The students provided support to each in dealing with the ultra-nationalist student and they decided that they could manage the harm that he caused to them. However, I called him on and set limits for his personal attacks on the White students. At the same time, my students and I appreciated the educational benefits and challenges that the Aztec student provided for all of us and to himself. In this example, educational freedom of exploring ideas (IPD) collided with the students’ well-being and I was prioritizing the students’ well-being over IPD (i.e., education in my definition).

I think that it is the teacher and students’ responsibility to maintain peace and avoid mutual harm in the space of education. Occasionally, this may put limits on the IPD, exploration of ideas, and education itself. Policing can be prioritized over education at times. Teachers may have strong commitment to their own values of protecting societally oppressed minorities, “As a classroom teacher many years ago, I made it very clear that I believed that homosexuality was something that was a choice I respected, that I had gay and lesbian friends, that gay jokes were unacceptable in the classroom, etc. I do not naively believe that my students somehow internalized my beliefs (though I was probably more transmissionist then than I am now), but I still think that encountering those beliefs was important, certainly for the closeted kids undoubtedly in the room, but also for everyone else.” I agree that policing can be necessary in class but: 1) the policing in education should not be confused with education itself and 2) this policing has to be the object of education itself — it has to be involved in the IPD of educational public forum with the students as much as possible (I foresee some rare cases that I may be not fully or totally impossible due to some privacy, safety, or legality considerations). The PRACTICE of education has not one but many goals that should guide educational practitioners. Educators have many—many goals (sometimes too many): police-person keeping peace and safety, organizer, social worker, lawmaker, judge, advocate, propagandist, politician, caregiver, citizen, and so on and so forth. Somewhat similar can be said about diverse and polymorphic roles of students. Education, and educator in a narrow sense of being concern with Education, is only one of many roles of the teacher (and students). Even more, sometimes the non-educational roles have to be legitimately prioritized. For example, when a person crosses a street without watching for a car traffic, the best immediate action is to pull the person physically back on the walking pavement rather than to try to educate him or her. Sometimes non-educational and/or educational instrumental goals have to take an emergency priority or even completely replace educational goals. Metaphorically speaking, at times, a teacher should prioritize safety and VIOLENTLY pull the student back to the pavement, without trying to educate the student about the danger of crossing road without looking around. Yes, all this is true. HOWEVER, it is important to abstract the unique sphere of EDUCATION and claim that in the educational practice this sphere has to be prioritize ON AVERAGE (but not necessarily in each and every case).

The third challenge for the pluralistic dialogic approach is coming from a conventional school institution and the entire society, promoting technological monologic paradigm of education. Conventional schooling and the society imposes constraints, conditions, and demands that promote non-dialogic and non-pluralistic values. In my view, the educators should fight these impositions by diverse political means negotiating professional flexibility, pushing back, smuggling alternative values, and, what is probably most important, engaging the students in critical dialogue about these values, impositions and consequences.

The fourth challenge for the pluralistic dialogic approach is coming from a possibility that dialogic critical education can undermine family and local community values in the student and, thus, may ostracize the student from these communities. As our colleague, Jay Lemke wrote, “I agree that liberation from uncritical traditional values can be of benefit. But not always. For example when it leads to ostracism from conservative family or community/church. Bigger problem is anomie. It is easy to break from old values because all values have flaws, but hard then to construct new values that feel solid. For all values to remain contingent, like truth propositions, is often too alienating and frightening for people. When the ground gives way, on what will you stand? Very few people can simply fly” (December 22, 2014, https://www.facebook.com/DialogicPedagogyJournal/posts/917787528232547?reply_comment_id=920182844659682&total_comments=6). I think that this concern is very legitimate and it is up to the student to decide whether and where to draw the line between his/her well-being and education in general and dialogic pedagogy in specific. Finally, there is a related issue of the essentially voluntary nature of education that cannot be forced on the students, “You can lead a horse to water but you can't make it drink.” This means that if a student desires to remain uneducated, this desire is legitimate (Neill, 1960).

What do you think?

Values and Dilemmas of Pedagogy

Jay Lemke

As a latecomer to the online Facebook dialogue about the teaching of values and values for teaching cited above, I was asked to comment further on the issues and arguments, which are well presented and summarized, I think, in his editorial essay.

I want to comment briefly on several of the issues and then extend the dialogue into a critical discussion about the role of Modernism in framing our own values of diversity and critique. I want to ask what might come next? What might be better than liberal, democratic values of critical inquiry?

As Eugene points out, and most of us know, it’s unrealistic to imagine an education that is “value-free”. The mere fact that schools exist and are paid for by taxes, much less that they are everywhere compulsory, embodies liberal democratic values in the broad sense. The selection of what is studied in schools, what is tested, what is required for college admission – all of these implicitly define very specific values. They are a mix of traditional dominant values (e.g. elite literature, canonical history) from the 18th and 19th centuries and late modernist values (science, mathematics, computer education, vocational education), which are pretty explicitly also economic values of productive labor and wealth accumulation. Each required school discipline or subject brings its own value traditions to the classroom. In schools, if not in their professional fields, Literature advocates for humanist and esthetic values and History for

Merely pointing this out raises the question of the responsibility of teachers to identify and critique the implicit and taken-for-granted values of their subject and their teaching methods. Should they be made explicit for students? Should alternatives be fairly presented? Should the disciplines’ values be subjected to sharp critique and debate? And if not, what kind of values does that choice represent? Nowhere in the school curriculum are the wider values of our dominant secular culture critiqued: democracy, individualism, capitalism, growth, tolerance, diversity. Much less those of the still prevalent religious traditions. There is a social and political taboo on criticism or even discussion of such issues in schools. Those taboos and exclusions also represent values.

In the online discussion and Eugene’s essay, it is also fairly clear that most of us accept that teachers’ own values necessarily find their way into the classroom: whether in our enthusiasm for the values inherent in our subjects, in explicit expressions of personal opinions, or in our deliberate silences and self-censorship (readily noticed by students). But it should also be clear that there is a cline of power and coercion present here: from humble contributions of identified-as-personal opinion, to normative presentations of (explicit and implicit) values as ones that students are expected to accept, to coercive threats and punishments (from embarrassment to grades to disciplinary actions). Morally, I believe, the bar is raised as we move along this cline, requiring us to more explicitly identify and defend the value basis of an action, and to subject it to public critique and debate. Of course, in practice we usually find just the reverse: those transgressions of values subjected to the most severe sanctions are precisely the ones where the values themselves are not open to challenge.

At the end of his essay, Eugene kindly quotes one of my core concerns about dialogic and especially critical pedagogy that aims to act as a “spoilsport” and interrupt the usual processes of implicit socialization into community values by promoting, and even requiring, explicit critique and dialogic debate. I wrote:

I agree that liberation from uncritical traditional values can be of benefit. But not always. For example when it leads to ostracism from conservative family or community/church. Bigger problem is anomie. It is easy to break from old values because all values have flaws, but hard then to construct new values that feel solid. For all values to remain contingent, like truth propositions, is often too alienating and frightening for people. When the ground gives way, on what will you stand? Very few people can simply fly.

Here I remind us of the potential harms of the critical interrogation of values. What are the personal and social costs to a student who becomes convinced of scientific values regarding evidence and truth, say in the case of Darwinian evolutionary theory, and brings these home to a fundamentalist Christian family which regards them as the work of the devil and destructive of Biblical family and moral values? What of the family of his girlfriend who won’t let her see him anymore? What of the young man who becomes convinced he should be proud to be gay and comes out to his conservative family and is disowned and thrown out on the street? What of the student who loses all faith in traditional moral values as groundless and indefensible and is lost either to anomie or sociopathic behavior?

Our classic myth about this tells of Socrates, the gadfly (spoilsport?), who corrupted the youth of Athens by undermining their faith in the God and traditional morals and producing students like the infamous Alcibiades, who worked to overthrow the Athenian democratic constitution. We’re all taught that
Values in dialogic pedagogy
Eugene Matusov and Jay lemke

Socrates was right, that he was a Christ-like martyr. Who tells the other side of this story? Who seriously thinks about the other side?

Modern liberal values were forged over a century or two as part of the historical project of overcoming traditional values and the social-political order they supported. Our myth here is the not-very-factual account of Galileo’s “martyrdom” by the Catholic Church and the eventual triumph of Reason over Faith, of Science over Superstition. Historical analysis paints a much more complex and ambivalent picture. Traditional values, which are today in many parts of the world re-asserting themselves, included the priority of the family and community over the desires of the individual, and a stable social order in which religious, moral, and political authority were all mutually supporting.

Traditional Islam rejects the separation of Church and State and moral arguments that are not consistent with their religious beliefs. Our own modern separation of political from religious authority was the result of centuries of destructive civil wars once our own European medieval unity was broken by diversity of beliefs. Even now, many Fundamentalist Christians in the United States do not accept the separation and believe that religious belief should be the basis of political action, and indeed of intolerance (no gay teachers, no atheists in political office). Fundamentalist Jews in Israel advocate for an intolerant theocratic State. Traditionalist Hindus in India are also often nationalists looking to undo the liberalism imported from Europe. Even normally pacific Buddhists have turned to violence in Myanmar and Sri Lanka, in part to insure that their traditions, not those of Islam or Christianity, will be the successors to Western Modernism. African Christians, Russian Orthodox nationalists, and many other illiberal ideological movements around the world, deeply disenchanted with Liberal Rationalist Modernism, are showing that its 19th and 20th century victory was only a limited political and economic one, and far from irreversible.

The modern liberal (and scientific) value that everything should be subject to critique was part of the arsenal of the war against Premodern traditional society and its moral-religious culture. So was the emphasis on individual liberty, autonomy, freedom of speech, and eventually pluralist diversity and tolerance. These values were born first in the rhetoric of the religious dissenters who broke the nominal unity of the Christian world. Then by the scientists and Enlightenment thinkers who did not wish to be limited by official unity of belief (and by and large they were also religious believers and dissenters, famously Newton). In the canon, the other voice is represented by Thomas Hobbes and Leviathan, which appeals to community and tradition, and makes the argument that unless all public expressions of belief -- religious, political, or scientific -- are governed by a unity embodied in the Sovereign (who speaks for the community, as the Caliph does in Islamic theory), there will be nothing but endless civil war.

That period of history (17th century) was such a period of civil war, far more pervasive, lasting, and horrifying than our cool textbook accounts portray it. And I think it's coming back today on a global scale. The Modernist liberal detente is falling apart as non-Western societies break free of European cultural hegemony, and all the traditionalist value communities, including the Judeo-Christian ones, challenge liberalism again.

In societies that were more culturally homogeneous than our modern urban ones, traditionalist values worked relatively well. Liberal values sold themselves first as freedom for progress (economic, social, technological) and later as the only basis of mutually tolerant peaceful co-existence in a diverse world. But they have also become associated in the minds of many throughout the world with capitalist economic exploitation and wealth inequality, Western political imperialism and neo-colonialism, and the moral degeneracy of a hedonistic, consumer-pandering, world-polluting, de-spiritualized worldsystem.
It seems to me to be imperative in the present moment of history for those of us who are the children of liberal Modernism to ask: What comes after? And by this I mean to hope that what comes after can be better. Better adapted to global ecological sustainability, more supportive of social and economic justice, better able to avoid endemic violence on every scale. Better than what the historical values of liberal Modernism espouse:

- If the human species manages to survive on this planet, and perhaps others, for thousands of years into the future, it is impossible that no better political system than representative democracy will ever arise. What will it be?
- It already seems clear to many of us that we urgently need to develop better social supports for learning and education than can be provided by the institution of isolated school buildings with classrooms of 30 students to one teacher, and uniform standardized curricula and testing. What will it be?
- Individual freedom has become the shield behind which a few individuals and corporations pursue narrow interests inimical to the wider society and the sustainability of the species. How will we rebalance individual and community needs?
- The consumer capitalist political economy has become addicted to unlimited growth -- of population, markets, sales, wealth, and tax revenues -- that is inevitably destructive of the planetary systems that sustain life. Under what new worldsystem can we avoid the catastrophe that social and economic justice on a global scale will kill us all?

What does this have to do with values and dialogic pedagogy? First, it asks us to understand the ways in which the value of unlimited critique of values itself arose as a specific response to historical conditions. It asks us to consider what is different about the historical moment of today. And it asks us to take a step to move beyond where we have been. Can we take this step in the classroom? Can we take it together with our students? Our students will have to face the challenges of a less hopeful world, a less peaceful world. They will need to move beyond us towards values suited to their times and their needs. How can we help? What do you think?

References

Values in dialogic pedagogy
Eugene Matusov and Jay lemke


NEW ARTICLES IN THIS JOURNAL ARE LICENSED UNDER A CREATIVE COMMONS ATTRIBUTION 4.0 UNITED STATES LICENSE.