Abstract

In September 2011 in Rome at the International Society for Cultural and Activity Research conference, Eugene Matusov (USA), Kiyotaka Miyazaki (Japan), Jayne White (New Zealand), and Olga Dysthe (Norway) organized a symposium on Dialogic Pedagogy. Formally during the symposium and informally after the symposium several heated discussions started among the participants about the nature of dialogic pedagogy. The uniting theme of these discussions was a strong commitment by all four participants to apply the dialogic framework developed by Soviet-Russian philosopher and literary theoretician Bakhtin to education. In this special issue, Eugene Matusov (USA) and Kiyotaka Miyazaki (Japan) have developed only three of the heated issues discussed at the symposium in a form of dialogic exchanges (dialogue-disagreements). We invited our Dialogic Pedagogy colleagues Jayne White (New Zealand) and Olga Dysthe (Norway) to write commentaries on the dialogues. Fortunately, Jayne White kindly accepted the request and wrote her commentary. Unfortunately, Olga Dysthe could not participate due to her prior commitments to other projects. We also invited Ana Marjanovic-Shane (USA), Beth Ferholt (USA), Rupert Wegerif (UK), and Paul Sullivan (UK) to comment on Eugene-Kiyotaka dialogue-disagreement.

The first two heated issues were initiated by Eugene Matusov by providing a typology of different conceptual approaches to Dialogic Pedagogy that he had noticed in education. Specifically, the debate with Kiyotaka Miyazaki (and the other two participants) was around three types of Dialogic Pedagogy defined by Eugene Matusov: instrumental, epistemological, and ontological types of Dialogic Pedagogy. Specifically, Eugene Matusov subscribes to ontological dialogic pedagogy arguing that dialogic pedagogy should be built around students’ important existing or emergent life interests, concerns, questions, and needs. He challenged both instrumental dialogic pedagogy that is mostly interested in using dialogic interactional format of instruction to make students effectively arrive at preset curricular endpoints and epistemological dialogic pedagogy that is most interested in production of new knowledge for students. Kiyotaka Miyazaki (and other participants) found this typology not to be useful and challenged the values behind it. Kiyotaka Miyazaki introduced the third heated topic of treating students as “heroes” of the teacher’s polyphonic pedagogy similar to Dostoevsky’s polyphonic novel based on Bakhtin’s analysis. Eugene Matusov took issue with treating students as “heroes” of teacher’s polyphonic pedagogy arguing that in Dialogic Pedagogy students author their own education and their own becoming.

Originally, we wanted to present our Dialogue on Dialogic Pedagogy in the following format. An initiator of a heated topic develops his argument, the opponent provides a counter-argument, and then the initiator has an opportunity to reply with his “final word” (of course, we know that there is no “final word” in a dialogue). However, after
Part I

Instrumental vs. ontological dialogic pedagogy

(by Eugene Matusov)

Several of my colleagues, interested in dialogic pedagogy, have been asking me about the differences between “instrumental dialogic pedagogy” and “ontological dialogic pedagogy” – the terms that I used in my (Matusov, 2009a) book “Journey into Dialogic Pedagogy” and elsewhere. In brief, I introduced the terms “instrumental” and “ontological” in reference to diverse versions of Dialogic Pedagogy because I have noticed two important tendencies in educational practices and their conceptualization, when scholars and practitioners, talk about pedagogical dialogue. In an instrumental dialogic tendency, educationalists (i.e., educational practitioners and scholars of education) use pedagogical dialogue in order to increase the likelihood of achieving essentially non-dialogic educational and non-educational means like: increasing test scores and learning outcomes (Brown, 1997; Johnson & Johnson, 1991), deepening students’ understanding of facts learned outside of pedagogical dialogue (Ada...
5. Pedagogical dialogue is aimed at efficient achievement of curricular endpoints preset by the teacher and/or State (e.g., understanding that the definition of virtues is more important than the issue of their origin – Socrates; unconditional inclusion is the basis for the social justice – Paley; following the Party’s directives is the way to freedom and prosperity – Freire).

In contrast, ontological approaches to dialogic pedagogy emphasize that both meaning making process and humanity are essentially dialogic and, thus, penetrating all aspects of pedagogy/education (Bakhtin, 1986, 1999; Buber, 1996, 2000; Sidorkin, 1999).

The dialogic nature of consciousness, the dialogic nature of human life itself. The single adequate form for verbally expressing authentic human life is the open-ended [i.e., “unfinished” – EM] dialogue. Life by its very nature is dialogic. To live means to participate in dialogue: to ask questions, to heed, to respond, to agree, and so forth. In this dialogue a person participates wholly and throughout his whole life: with his eyes, lips, hands, soul, spirit, with his whole body and deeds. He invests his entire self in discourse, and this discourse enters into the dialogic fabric of human life, into the world symposium (Bakhtin, 1999, p. 293, italics is original).

Ontological dialogue generates its own unfinalized dialogic values by searching for and testing ideas and values against other ideas and values (cf. Aristotelian notion of praxis, see Aristotle, 2000; Carr, 2006). Ontological dialogue has its own dialogic value in itself as the inherently valuable way of being, non-reducible to any other ways of being. Let me illustrate this point with my colleague’s and mine research on “instrumental learning” vs. “ontological learning”.

My undergraduate student Daniella (Muller) Eilif and I conducted a study of “instrumental” and “ontological” learning (Matusov, Eilif, Fan, Choi, & Hampel, 2014, submitted). Daniella and I interviewed people of diverse age (from 9 to 75), gender, educational levels, professions, ways of life, and socio-economic status from three countries: US (21), Russia (17), and Brazil (21) posing to them the following hypothetical question, “Imagine scientists invented Magic Learning Pills so people can learn instantaneously what has been known in the past and become skillful in any area of known practice. For what kind of learning would you want to use the Magic Learning Pills and for what kind of learning would you reject the Magic Learning Pills? Why?” Very few respondents said they would take the magic pill to acquire skills and knowledge. Similarly, few respondents said they would always reject the magic pill. Our major finding was that a high majority of interviewees reported two types of desired learning: 1) instrumental learning, for which they would want to take the Magic Learning Pill and 2) ontological learning, for which they would reject taking the Magic Learning Pill. In instrumental learning, the learning itself is not valued, but actually disvalued, focusing on the desired ends. In instrumental learning, the process of learning is often viewed negatively as time-consuming, effort-consuming, frustrating, humiliating, painful, involving rote memorization of facts, boring, uneventful, annoying, scary, confidence eroding, financially expensive, well-defined, limited in time and space, measurable, finalized, and so on. Instrumental learning exists outside of people and does not transform the people – it can be separated and extracted from people and their life into a “magic learning pill” and passed to other people. After instrumental learning people essentially remain the same (i.e., “people + knowledge/skills”). Instrumental learning is about acquiring preset curricular endpoints (i.e., curricular standards). Instrumental learning is poiesis, i.e., a process, which quality is judged by the criteria established outside of the process, i.e., by achieving preset endpoints (Aristotle, 2000; Carr, 2006).

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2 We also got more complicated cases of instrumental responses insisting on NOT taking the Magic Learning Pill because it may devalue their learning achievements and/or values of their knowledge and/or skill mastery that give them a special social status in their social groups or in the entire society. Knowledge and mastery can provide important scarcity that can be a basis for a desired social status.
In contrast, in ontological learning, the learning process has an intrinsic value in itself and can be viewed positively as pleasure; interesting challenge (including even frustration and pain); “curious wonder” (Taylor, 1968); deep, bottomless, unfinalized understanding; dialogic relationship with important others; growth; life itself; creativity; becoming somebody different; experiential; eventful (even at times through dramatic, painful, and tragic events); relational, valuing others; situational, ill-defined; immeasurable; not limited in time and space; unfinalized; and so on. As one interviewee justified why she would not take the Magic Learning Pill for her particular desired learning, “I don’t want to shorten my life.” In the ontological learning, the learning process is in itself a valuable event of the person’s life. Ontological learning cannot be separated from people because it defines people. Ontological learning defines learner’s becoming and transcending the ontologically and epistemologically given (and ready-made culture). Ontological learning is praxis, i.e., a process defining its own criterion for its quality and virtues (Aristotle, 2000; Carr, 2006).

In instrumental dialogue, life of the students and their education are often split – the students’ education is out of the students’ life as “preparation for life.” In contrast, in ontological dialogue they remain the same: education is life, life is education, (cf. Dewey’s famous statement “Education is not preparation for life; education is life itself…. Education, therefore, is a process of living and not a preparation for future living”). Ontological dialogue is inherently eventful, dramatic, and full of learning surprises for both the teacher and the students. Instrumental dialogue can also be eventful, dramatic, and surprising but these qualities are not essential for instrumental dialogue, they can be accidental and peripheral (if not annoying, from a point of view of instrumental learning, see a discussion of the notion of "off-script" in Kennedy, 2005).

Alexander Sidorkin (1999) and I (Matusov, 2009a) argued that ontological dialogue penetrates all forms of human interaction and relations even in very distorted forms like in slavery (see Hegel & Baillie, 1967, for Hegel's brilliant analysis of this distortion in slaveowners’ dream for “an ideal slave”). Similarly, a Russian educationalist and scholar of ontological dialogue Alexander Lobok argues that one can find aspects and islands of ontological dialogue in any teaching (Lobok, 2001, 2008). However, ontological pedagogical dialogue becomes full-fledged when an educator realizes its value and tries to guide his or her pedagogical actions and pedagogical designs based on ontological dialogue.

The notion of ontological dialogue, beyond its inherent emphasis on dialogue as the essence of life, is unfinalized and contested as it is defined itself through practice and dialogue about this practice among all its immediate and remote participants. However, in my view, even so unfinalized, it opposes all six distinguished characteristics of instrumental dialogue listed above:

1. Pedagogical (ontological) dialogue is the end in itself, which cannot be understood outside of the notion of dialogue, “Dialogue is not something we do or use; it is relation that we enter into” (Burbules, 1993, p. xii, italics original);
2. Although pedagogical (ontological) dialogue may incline to instructional conversation, it penetrates any form of instructional method, including lecture. A lecture can be dialogic if it is a long answer to students’ question or inquiry (pre-existing the lecture or emergent in the lecture);
3. Pedagogical (ontological) dialogue is not a type of activity among other non-dialogic types of activities, but rather it is the participants’ orientation in any activity, specific value on dialogue as the meaning-making process and humanity, and guidance for the teacher’s pedagogical actions and pedagogical designs;
4. Pedagogical (ontological) dialogue, like meaning making or humanity, cannot and should not be switched on and off;
5. Genuine education, as exploration of societal and personal values — praxis of praxis (Matusov &
Marjanovic-Shane, 2012) — occurs through pedagogical (ontological) dialogue;

6. Pedagogical (ontological) dialogue defines its own emergent endpoints in the students as temporary outcomes embedded in dialogue.

To my big surprise, I found a similar opposition between two types of pedagogical dialogues in work by a Russian-American educational philosopher Alexander Sidorkin who was also influenced by Bakhtin (and Buber). In my judgment, our recognition of the two main approaches to dialogic pedagogies was identical. Even our terminology was very close as we both independently came to the notion of “ontological dialogue.” However, in contrast to me, Sidorkin called “non-ontological” what I call “instrumental”. Later, I have realized that this opposition between instrumental pedagogical dialogue and ontological pedagogical dialogue has to be revised. Initially, I thought that non-instrumental and ontological were synonymous. But currently, I have come to the conclusion that non-instrumental dialogic approaches constitute a bigger class of dialogic approaches, in which ontological dialogue is a part along with other non-instrumental but also non-ontological approaches. So far, I have recognized two more non-instrumental, non-ontological dialogic approaches: Epistemological Dialogic Approach II and Ecological Dialogic Approach. I have also found diverse instrumental approaches that include: Epistemological Dialogic Approach I and Social Justice Dialogic Approach. These approaches appear in Figure 1 below and can also be viewed here http://diaped.soe.udel.edu/dp-map/?page_id=18.

Figure 1. Dialogic and Conventional Pedagogies
Epistemological vs. ontological pedagogical dialogue
(by Eugene Matusov)

Epistemological pedagogical dialogue – a family of dialogic pedagogical approaches – prioritizes, purifies, and totalizes the intellectual endeavor of knowledge production over all other human endeavors including relational concerns and tensions; conflicts of desires; human ecology; issues of injustice; participants’ attractions, excitements, interests, and repelleces (i.e., biases); aesthetics; vanity; ethics; responsibility; morality and so on – what I’d argue constitute the totality of human ontology. Of course, all these ontological aspects may be a focus of an intellectual investigation AND all of these ontological aspects have an intellectual component in each of them AND, finally, intellectual endeavors occur in ontological spaces. However, I argue that these ontological aspects cannot be reduced to intellectual decision making, and purification of intellectual endeavors from their ontological spaces and aspects is counterproductive, when applied comprehensively. For example, reduction of study of physics reduced only to development of intellectual ideas does not help to understand and appreciate the sociocultural and ontological nature of the practices — historical actors look like naïve or even stupid by ignoring “obvious” issues and arguments developed later after them (Kumar, 2008; Matusov, 2014). In my view, this issue alone is at the core of what separates epistemological3 dialogues from ontological dialogue.

Using Aristotelian poiesis-praxis terminology (Aristotle, 2000; Carr, 2006), epistemological dialogue transforms a practice in poiesis, in which goal, endpoint, value, and virtue (i.e., what is good) are (firmly or somewhat) known in advance; while ontological dialogue considers a practice as praxis, in which goal, endpoint, value and virtue emerge in the activity itself. Because of this poiesis nature of practice in epistemological dialogue, it often pre-defines the virtue of its intellectual endeavor in the immutable hierarchy of the preset “good” over the preset “bad”: systemic thinking over syncretic thinking (Vygotsky, 1987); formal-operation thinking over preoperational thinking (Piaget, 1985); theoretical over concrete (Davydov, 2008); symphonic thinking over absurdist thinking (see a description of an innovative school using this hierarchy in von Duyke, 2013); dialectical thinking over formal logical thinking (Ilyenkov, 1977); high culture over low culture; advanced culture over primitive culture (Vygotsky & Luria, 1993). In contrast, in the praxis, the relationships between these oppositions can be very diverse – including the listed ones -- depending on local contexts and emerging values.

Studying literature and practice of dialogic pedagogy, so far I have extracted two types of epistemological pedagogical dialogue: instrumental epistemological dialogue (Epistemological II) and non-instrumental epistemological dialogue (Epistemological II).

Epistemological instrumental pedagogical dialogue (Epistemological I)

The epistemological instrumental dialogic pedagogy is probably the first published account of dialogic pedagogy that still remains very influential and important for all scholars and practitioners of the dialogic pedagogy field – namely Socratic Dialogue in Plato’s version. I am sure that it will remain an object of inspiration, analysis, and exciting discoveries (Phillips, 2002). Like Bakhtin (1999), I am rather ambivalent about it. I appreciate its focus on asking good questions, attendance to students’ subjectivity, focus on provocations and contradictions, disrupting familiar and often unreflected relations, dialogue at

3 My use of the word “epistemological” is metaphorical, impressionistic and not conceptual one — I try to capture and describe the phenomenon in Dialogic Pedagogy with this descriptor.
the threshold, being carnivalesque, and so on. But I am also, like Bakhtin, concerned with the teacher’s manipulation of the student’s consciousness and intellectualism (Matusov, 2009a).

The epistemological instrumental dialogic pedagogy is characterized by the use of dialogue between the teacher and the students and among the students to achieve some particular intellectual curricular endpoints preset by the teacher. Dialogue here is a pedagogical method (e.g., Socratic Method) or an instructional strategy along with other pedagogical methods and instructional strategies, which can be switched on and switched off. Thus, both Adler (1982; 1984) and Burbules (1993) argue that presentation of a unfamiliar material or new information should be done by the teacher in a straightforward lecturing or in general direct instruction ways, while deepening understanding has to be done in a form of (Socratic) dialogue. Since the students do not have any prior knowledge of unfamiliar material, it does not make sense to dialogue about it, from this instrumental perspective. This approach to dialogue as a method can be traced in Plato’s Socrates when Socrates gives an example of giving directions to a certain place to someone as a task not worthy nor appropriate of dialogic investigation (e.g., see a dialogue between Meno and Socrates, Plato & Bluck, 1961). Thus, the epistemological instrumental pedagogy is primary concerned with deepening students’ intellectual understanding about something but this deepening has some curricular endpoints like, for example, in case of the Meno dialogue, that the virtue is problematic and inherited, or that by increasing the sides of a square twice, the area of the square will increase by four times.

The dialogic method of the epistemological instrumental pedagogy is organized in a series of questions-answers usually initiated by the teacher (but not always) and often undergoes 4 phases:

1. **engaging the students in teacher-defined material** – as the Meno dialogue shows, it can be quite a struggle because the students might have their own agendas and/or might not be immediately interested in teacher-defined issues;

2. **searching for and revealing misconceptions in the students’ subjectivity about the teacher-defined issues** – this revelation is first done by the teacher him or herself as the students often are not aware that they have misconceptions and contradictions in their thinking and perception of the reality. Here is where a genuine dialogue is permissible and tolerable by the teacher;

3. **leading the students into numbing contradictions about their misconceptions** (the so-called “torpedo touch”) – it is important to develop in the students a sense of paralysis from the revealed contradiction between two strong alternatives rooted in the students’ own subjectivity; all ways out suggested by the students should be convincingly blocked by the teacher;

4. **leading the students to the preset curricular endpoint as the only possible and logical solution of the contradiction** – the teacher usually blocks any alternatives in themes and in solutions. Here is where genuine dialogue is usually less permitted and tolerated by the teacher.

There is absence of the teacher’s epistemological learning in the dialogue – despite Socrates’ insistence about the benefits to his own learning I did not find evidence in any of Plato’s dialogues, that Socrates changed his mind or learned anything new that he did not know prior to the dialogues (Matusov, 2009a, ch. 2). In instrumental epistemological pedagogical dialogue, a teacher may learn some new pedagogical knowledge about how to teach better — e.g., how the teacher can address better students’ old, known, and new, emerging, misconceptions — but not epistemological knowledge about intellectual subject matter, new inquiries previously unknown by the teacher (Matusov, 2009a, ch. 4).

As in case of Plato’s Socrates, I suspect that the teacher’s manipulation of the students’ subjectivities often involves self-manipulation of the teacher’s own consciousness to truly believe that the preset curricular endpoint is the only possible and logical outcome. Indeed, it is a mathematical fact that the area of a square is equal to the square of its sides. What can be problematic there? But, as I showed
with the example of $2+2=4$ (Matusov, 2009a), it is never the case – anything and everything is questionable and problematic if there is desire to look deeper: two friends plus two friends may not always be equal to four friends. As Bakhtin (1986) argued, understanding is bottomless.

Elsewhere I argued (Matusov, 2009a, ch. 2) that Plato’s Socratic Dialogic Method is a bizarre combination of radical pedagogical constructivism, based on dialogic investigation of truth though revealing contradictions in people’s thinking, and radical philosophical positivism, based on the preset curricular endpoints reflecting the eternal, universal ideas. Now, I wonder if this combination of radical pedagogical constructivism and radical philosophical positivism is a birthmark of any epistemological instrumental dialogic pedagogy. Since Socrates, this position has been reinforced by the Rationalism of the Enlightenment (the Modernism), according to which, reasonable, well-intended people with access to the same information will come to the same conclusion. The Modernist Rational mind has to be subordinate to the Iron Logic of the Universal Necessity and purify itself from any other irrational and corrupting influences like emotions, values, beliefs, responsibility, traditions, social justice, loyalties, vanities, reputations, and judgments (Matusov, 2014). In this approach, consensus and agreement are prioritized – reaching a rational consensus among rational people through the free marketplace of ideas is a proxy for reaching the Truth. When the rational consensus is reached, it sets a curricular endpoint for education.

In my view, necessity is only an aspect of discourse and by itself it is shaped by other aspects (e.g., values, emotions) and as well penetrates them. People’s logic does not need to follow the necessity and does not need to slavishly submit to it because the necessity and logic are shaped people’s axiology (i.e., the value system), ontology, and ethics. The logic and necessity do not provide alibi-in-being using Bakhtin’s metaphor (1993) but require active authorship of values and commitments and responsibility, which is irreducible to logic and necessity (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2014, in press-a, 2014, in press-b).

Finally, I want to comment on the elitist nature of the epistemological instrumental dialogic pedagogy. Since, the truth and power associated with it is rooted in the Dialogic Method of investigation, people who profess in the Method have to be on top of the society – this is a rather logical conclusion from the epistemological instrumental dialogic pedagogy. According to Plato’s Republic, the world has to be ruled by philosophers over all other “deficient” and “ignorant” people.

**Epistemological non-instrumental dialogue (Epistemological II)**

The epistemological non-instrumental dialogic pedagogy prioritizes the intellectual sublime of the high culture. It focuses on “the eternal damn final questions” (Bakhtin, 1999). It is interested in the mundane only because it can give the material and opportunity to move to the sublime (see Phillips, 2002, as a good example). The non-instrumental epistemological dialogue is a purified dialogue to abstract a single main theme, a development of a main concept, and unfolding the logic – interested in purification of a dialogue into dia-logics (Berlyand, 2009; Bibler, 2009). Due to this purification, epistemological dialogue occurs in de-ontologized intellectual space and time.

In my view, as a tool of a particular investigation of an ontological dialogue, this purification can be legitimate in certain situations. However, modeling classroom discussion after an epistemological dialogue can lead to pedagogical violence as a way of “disciplining the students’ minds” so they remain on the theme and only engage in the intellectual framework defined by the teacher, which is always the most important. It brackets the complexity, ontological massiveness, and interconnection of the diverse themes and makes certain “irrelevant” agendas, interests, strengths, desires, and ontological groundings
as inappropriate and illegitimate (which, in its own turn, requires policing the discourse and issuing punitive actions for violators of the epistemological regime).

In my view, one of the good representations of the epistemological non-instrumental dialogue is Lakatos (1981). Lakatos starts his book on imaginary pedagogical dialogue about mathematical investigation with a very keen and thoughtful observation on his own endeavor. He ended his introduction to the book with the following words, “The dialogue form [in his book] should reflect the dialectic of the story [i.e., history of the discoveries and developments of math ideas]; it is meant to contain a sort of rationally reconstructed or ‘distilled’ history” (Lakatos, 1981, p. 5, italics is original).

I want to focus on this nature of “distillation” or purification that Lakatos mentioned. Lakatos was talking about distillation, reconstruction, and purification of the history of the math practice, while I am interested in his distillation, reconstruction, and purification of ontological dialogue. History represents an ontological dialogue. But ontological dialogues can also be ahistorical and even imaginary (Dostoevsky’s novels present such examples).

What are the differences between epistemological and ontological non-instrumental dialogues? Let me start with making observational notes about their similarities. First, like epistemological non-instrumental dialogue, ontological dialogue can also involve abstractions from, and reconstructions of, live conversations (and it can be entirely fictional). So, it is not focused on “exactness” that produces the difference, although it is true that ontological dialogue has more, what can be called, “life details.” Second, ontological dialogue can also focus on epistemological issues and intellectual investigations. Thus, it is not the thematic focus that makes the difference. Third, non-instrumental epistemological dialogues usually (or maybe even always) preserve particular voices and generate person-ideas, although in an epistemological dialogue, the person is subordinated to and deduced from the idea. Hence, the strong presence and depiction of particular rich voices does not distinguish ontological and epistemological dialogues. Fourth, both types of dialogues can promote (as well as deviate from) the regime of internally persuasive discourse (IPD) described by Bakhtin as open-ended honest search for truth by all participants (but not as a sense of “appropriation” of the teacher’s voice by the voices of the students, see instrumental dialogue) (Holquist, 1990; Matusov, 2007a; Matusov & von Duyke, 2010; Morson, 2004; Morson & Emerson, 1990). Fifth, they both can be carnivalesque with throning and dethroning the authority (Bakhtin, 1999; Sullivan, Smith, & Matusov, 2009). Sixth, both types of dialogues can involve dramas of ideas and people, although in an epistemological non-instrumental dialogue, drama of the ideas defines drama of the participants.

I argue that the distillation, reconstruction, and purification nature of epistemological dialogue is about creation of the comprehensive, totalized, focus of all the participants of the dialogue on some unfolding theme (what is probably called by Berlyand, 1996; Bibler, 1997; Kurganov, 1989, as “a dialogic notion”). In contrast to ontological dialogue, epistemological non-instrumental dialogue is essentially mono-topic and comprehensive (i.e., universal and totalizing). Epistemological dialogues are self-contained.

Bakhtin (1999) defined voice that “includes a person’s worldview and fate. A person enters into dialogue as an integral voice. He participates in it not only with his thoughts, but with his fate and with his entire individuality” (Bakhtin, 1991, p. 293). The person’s fate cannot be reduced to one dialogue, to a person’s position in a dialogue, to the theme, to the logic, to the hierarchy, or to the sublime. Although, people can never be reduced to their mundane life circumstances, in which people are thrown and find themselves, the deeds that people made in these mundane circumstances penetrate and color the
sublime dialogue, which is the primary interest of the proponents of the non-instrumental epistemological dialogic pedagogy. For example, the mundane fact that a father of the American Revolution, Thomas Jefferson was a slaveowner until the end of his life (he owned 187 slaves), who fathered Black children who became slaves (he freed all of them before or after his death) from a slave concubine Sally Hemings (Sloan, 1998), colored his sublime position on freedom and equality to the point that has allowed some scholars to legitimately claim that Jefferson was not only a father of modern democracy but ALSO a father of modern racism since the practice of slavery, which Jefferson was a part of, and his claim that “all men are created equal” (written in the Declaration of Independence) required a justified exclusion of slaves from the notion of “men” – i.e., the ideology of racism (D’Souza, 1995). Jefferson’s voice and fate in a dialogue on freedom has been an uneasy intertwine of the sublime freedom-loving philosopher and politician, and the mundane slaveowner, enslaving his own children and lover.

Let me now turn to magnifying the differences between non-instrumental epistemological and ontological dialogues. First, epistemological dialogue does not involve an ontological meeting of the participants. Lakatos’ dialogue starts his epistemological dialogue with the following disclaimer:

The dialogue takes place in an imaginary classroom. The class gets interested in a PROBLEM: is there a relation between the number of vertices $V$, the number of edges $E$ and the number of faces $F$ of polyhedra -- particularly of regular polyhedra -analogous to the trivial relation between the number of vertices and edges of polygons, namely, that there are as many edges as vertices: $V = E$? This latter relation enables us to classify polygons according to the number of edges (or vertices): triangles, quadrangles, pentagons, etc. An analogous relation would help to classify polyhedra (Lakatos, 1981, p. 6, italics is original).

What is interesting here for me is that how this imaginary “class gets interested in a PROBLEM” is taken outside of the brackets of Lakatos’ dialogue. We do not know how and why this interest was developed and negotiated. We do not know how this interest is grounded in the participants’ lives. It is unclear why the participants care about the problem and what makes them care. What if some of the participants had not cared about this math problem, in particular, or math in general – how did Lakatos make them interested or, at least, cooperate with his dialogue? Was pedagogical violence (Matusov, 2009a; Sidorkin, 2002) involved in the process and if so, how? What (and how) created conditions for this classroom? Could the participants have freedom to leave it at any moment (like participants of Socrates’ dialogues, for example)? Below, I will provide themes that are present in ontological dialogue and absent in epistemological dialogue.

Frist, from a pedagogical point of view, an assumption or an expectation that all participants are automatically and non-problematically interested in a problem can lead to big pedagogical disasters and eventually to oppressive pedagogical violence. Yes, it is true that a common interest in a particular problem can emerge in the classroom but I argue that it usually required a lot of work from the teacher and/or it is relatively short lived and ecologically (i.e., emotionally, intellectually, physiologically, motivationally, and relationally) unsustainable.

Second, there is no ontological diversity nor does it intertwine with participants’ interests and agendas in epistemological dialogue. In Lakatos’s dialogue all the participants are totally committed to the problem set by the teacher. In contrast, in an ontological dialogue, the participants are involved in a problem space (usually consisting not only of one problem but of many dynamically emerging fuzzy tensions) that often has the shared and collective ownership, changing alliances, and diverse agendas. Thus, this problem space is often shaped by diverse, multiple, often fuzzy, uncertain, simultaneous and
dynamic ontological concerns by the participants. For example, in the case above, the participants might have multiple ontological concerns about fairness, grades, past interpersonal alliances and conflicts, making and maintaining friendships, explanation of Percentages, academic motivation, sexual flirting, romantics, vanity, hunger, stomachaches, and so on. All of these apparently mundane concerns by the participants, – “the mundane noise”, – seem to be annoying for an educator working in the non-instrumental epistemological dialogic pedagogy who wants to bracket and suppress them from the public space of the dialogue.

Third, there are no ontological concerns in participants about their reputation that emerge in, and transcend, the epistemological dialogue. Dialogue can change people’s relationships, professional and institutional stands, careers, reputations, fates, fights for material resources; – it can open and close institutional, relational, and societal opportunities that might have little to do with the theme of the sublime dialogue at hand. All of that is often bracketed in epistemological dialogues, probably, as spoilers of the purity of the arguments. Nothing outside of epistemological dialogue, outside of its world of ideas, -- “pulp” of the life -- is a concern.

Participants of an epistemological dialogue are often involved in drama, but it is a drama of pure intellectual ideas. In Lakatos’ dialogue, student Alpha leaves the dialogue, slamming the door in disgust, so to speak. However, his dramatic actions can be deduced from the unfolding logic of colliding ideas in the dialogue, as an emotional amplifier of an intellectual point. People, their personalities, their actions, their relations are reduced to their ideas (cf. Bakhtin, 1999, on the notion of person-idea). They are puppets of the self-contained logical development. For example, some proponents of epistemological dialogue view the suicide by famous German quantum physicist Paul Ehrenfest in 1933, as a logical development of his position in a debate with Einstein and Bohr (Kurganov, personal communication, July 2008) rather than as a possible tragic result of his struggle with chronic depression (Klein, 1985). Although, logic of intellectual development can probably define people’s fate in some (rare?) cases, it is doubtful that it can be the defining case in all, or even majority instances. However, in an epistemological non-instrumental dialogue, the participants’ ontology originates and is produced by the development of intellectual ideas.

Fourth, there is no ontological urgency in an epistemological dialogue. The chronotope of epistemological dialogue is the world of ideas. Here-and-now ontological urgency of life is not known in epistemological dialogue. Arguments can be postponed for 300 years or even more. Epistemological dialogue can occur whenever and wherever. Historical time is bracketed, physical and embedded semiotic space is bracketed. Historical time with its ontological urgency is random, shallow, and unimportant (Lakatos placed his historical comments into footnotes, probably, in order not to interrupt the flow of his epistemological dialogue).

Fifth, epistemological non-instrumental dialogue does not know interest in ontological ecology – only in the universal logical necessity (which can be multiple, according to Bibler, another proponent of the non-instrumental epistemological logic pedagogy, see Berlyand, 2009; Bibler, 2009). In contrast to the spirituality of the sublime, emphasized by the non-instrumental epistemological dialogue, the ontological ecology – the corporeality of the mundane – is essentially non-dialogic but it can be pulled in a sphere of ontological dialogicity. For example, with aging, I have noticed that I become crankier, more irritable, impulsive, and even depressed in late evenings. Although, during these times in the evening, I’m feeling that I have a reason to be like this – something or somebody bothers me and gets on my nerves, - - I have learned to know that it is probably a result of some biochemical imbalance in my body. In the morning, I often feel better: full of enthusiasm, optimism, patience, and sensitivity. I try to dialogize my
non-dialogic ecology by my attempts to use (not always successful) the famous Russian saying, "The morning is wiser than the evening" and not to make important relational decisions in the evening. Epistemological dialogue does not know ecological concerns, rather it mandates its regime of mono-topic total commitment and purity of the spiritual sublime.

Sixth, despite all assurance of the contrary (Phillips, 2002), the overall contempt for the mundane that the non-instrumental epistemological dialogic pedagogy expresses generates a kind of elitism with its all moral, ethical, and political consequences. If "unexamined life is not worth living" (Socrates-Plato), the worth of life and, ultimately the person living this life, is defined by the degree of how much a person can be a dialogic epistemological philosopher, examining his or her own life and the lives of others. The intellectual discourse on life – it is discursive examination, – becomes more important than the life itself (examined or unexamined) (see for a more discussion of this point in Kukathas, 2003). Using Aristotle's (2000) terms, the episteme overrules the phronēsis (and the technē and the sophia). The epistemological dialogue is not focused on just on any dialogue but only on the sublime dialogue of High Cultures. Thus, Bibler’s idea for school as “The School of the Dialogue of Cultures” can be characterized as “The School of the Dialogue of High Cultures” (see my debate on this issue with Irina Berlyand in Matusov, 2009b). A mundane chat or mundane activities might have different but still important wisdom than a philosophical discussion of the sublime – not to make wisdom the absolute acme of all other possible values and virtues.

I think that epistemological non-instrumental dialogue can inform, inspire, and provoke an ontological dialogue. Ontological dialogue can be legitimacy studied by reducing it to an epistemological non-instrumental dialogue (e.g., for tracking the logic of some particular theme unfolding in a dialogue). But epistemological non-instrumental dialogue cannot, and should not, guide ontological dialogue, especially in education, because in my view, the pedagogical regime of epistemological dialogue with its insistence on the “discipline of the mind” based on the total commitment of the mono-topic development of an idea and bracketing the ontology of the participants cannot be supported without relying on pedagogical violence. People cannot simply and totally commit all their time to the development of one theme, by themselves without an external violent push on them.

**Ontological pedagogical dialogue**

As far as I know the term “ontological dialogue” was coined by educational philosopher Alexander Sidorkin (1999) as opposition to other understandings of the notion of dialogue such as “instrumental dialogue”, “epistemological dialogue”, “communicational dialogue”, “linguistic dialogue” and so on. Sidorkin argues,

Notion of dialogue is treated [in an ontological understanding of dialogue – EM] as central for defining human existence, not merely a form of communication. To experience what it means to be human, one needs to engage in dialogical relations. We are human in the fullest sense when we engage in dialogue. This ontological understanding of dialogue has its implications for education. I argue that schools should focus on helping children experience and learn what it means to be human. Therefore, the entire social arrangement called "school" should be designed around this purpose of introducing children to the life of dialogue (Sidorkin, 1999, p. 4).

The word ontological does not refer to just any kind of being, neither does it deal with the existence of dialogue; it refers specifically to human existence. This may not be the most conventional use of the term, but from my point of view, it is the most accurate one. The ontological concept of dialogue explores the place of dialogue in the human way of being. One of
the reasons for using the adjective *ontological* is a need to distinguish between what I propose and a number of non-ontological concepts of dialogue. In the context of this book, the very existence of a human being in his or her human quality is a result of dialogue. In the non-ontological conception of dialogue, this relation between dialogue and human existence is reversed: dialogue is treated as secondary to human existence, mainly as a form of communication (Sidorkin, 1999, p. 7).

Let me provide my understandings and inferences from Sidorkin's deep and dense definition:

1. I understand the polysemic notion of ontology, "human being", "human existence", as our big and small ethical deeds ("поступки", "postupki" in Russian) and relations with others that define us in the world that we create, find ourselves, and in which we are thrown. Ontology has priority over epistemology – i.e., what and how we know about the world (i.e., epistemology) is a part of our being in the world (i.e., ontology). Ontology is charged with ethic, moral, judgment, politics, aesthetics, desire, will, emotions, responsibility, and so on. Epistemology is embraced by ontology, "How we breathe is how we write" (Soviet poet Bulat Okudzhava's lyrics) but not the other way around despite the fact that ontology is often the object of investigation by epistemology, which may affect the ontology (which is why critical ontological dialogue can be so important).

2. Ontological dialogue penetrates all aspects of the human existence, “Buber and Bakhtin, like Copernicus, discovered the new center of the human universe, the dialogical. It is the center in a sense that the very fact of human existence is contingent upon engagement in dialogical relations. An individual may exist as an organism in a physical or a biological sense. But we are truly human only when we are in a dialogical relation with another. The most important things in human lives happen between human beings, rather than within or without them” (Sidorkin, 1999, p. 11). Ontological dialogue penetrates both minute, routine, mundane, as well as the big scale time and the sublime. It does not have a beginning or an end. It penetrates even evil deeds like slavery (see Hegel's analysis of the Master's dream desire about his Slave full of dialogicity, in Hegel & Baillie, 1967). Any teaching, even, super conventional and monologic, is penetrated by ontological dialogue (Lobok, 2001, 2008). Oppressive regimes generate distorted ontological dialogue.

3. The concept of ontological provides two major frameworks: descriptive (i.e., how things are, see #2 above) and prescriptive, normative (i.e., how things should be). The prescriptive framework of ontological dialogue is usually defined by two concerns: humanity and critical overtaking of human affairs in their social and natural life.

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**“Show me ontological dialogue”: Ontological dialogue as a descriptive, methodological framework**

Where is ontological dialogue? Show it to me, please! Otherwise, everything sounds like philosophical mumbo-jumbo blah-blah-blah: it sounds good but what does it mean in practice? How to grab it? How to study it? Give me something concrete and point at that something and say, “This is ontological dialogue because…”. Operationalize “ontological dialogue” for me!

I do not try to mystify ontological dialogue but it is different from traditional methodology of “operationalization”. To some degree, ontological dialogue surrounding us in our everyday life, is too common and too familiar to be noticed. Ontological dialogue is not in the text but always between the beholder and other people. Let me provide an example to provoke and engage you, my reader, in what I mean:

More than twenty-five years ago, in the mid-1980s, I, in my twenties lived in a big Moscow apartment with my wife, my very young son, my grandmother Tanya in her mid-80s and her older sister, my grandaunt Klara who was almost 90. Klara used to be a technical editor but she worked all her life also as a tailor until...
almost her death making and adjusting dresses for our big extended family. Once at dinner, when we all met at a circle table, Klara asked us why her niece Rosa, who was in her late 60s then, stopped coming to visit. Rosa often visited her aunts running errands for them and provided company. I try to reconstruct our conversation that my wife and I had with Klara – I combine us together as “we” because neither my wife nor I can remember our exact utterances and who made them. I do not remember Tanya verbally participating in the conversation but she smiled with irony aligning with my wife and me against her sister, Klara.

Klara: I wonder why Rosa has stopped showing up at our place.

We: We are not surprised. You called her “cow” last time. She was upset. We think she probably still feels being offended by you.

Klara: Why would she become offended with me? She brought a new dress and asked my opinion. I told her my honest opinion that is that in this dress she looked like a cow. You know that I like to tell “mama-truth” in people’s face. It’s not my fault that she looked like a cow in this dress.

We: You hurt her feelings. You didn’t need to lie to Rosa but you could deliver your truth to Rosa in more soothing and nice way. For example, you could have said something like that, “It seems to me that this dress makes you look a bit chubby, no?”

Klara: That would have been a lie. It did not “seem” to me but I saw it in my own eyes that she looked like a cow in it. Not “a bit” and not “chubby”, but as a cow! Somebody must tell that to her.

We: Klara, she wanted to hear a word of encouragement from you, not your offending “mama-truth”.

Klara: Truth can’t be offending. “Don’t blame the mirror if your face is ugly!” If Rosa had wanted to hear a complement, she should have gone to men-suitors – not to me.

We: But admit, Klara, you don’t like truth about yourself when it’s unpleasant.

Klara: I always love the truth whatever it is. I always like when people tell me the truth even when it is bitter.

We: Do you? What about when people say that you are rude and insensitive?

Klara: I don’t like it because that simply is not true.

So, is it an example of ontological dialogue? Not, by itself, until it starts to be puzzling and interesting to you, reader. It puzzles and interests me. I wonder if Klara’s logic is based on some kind of logical fallacy that grants her right to tell unpleasant “mama-truth” to others while rejecting this right when “mama-truth” is presented by others to herself. Or her logic is OK, – it is consistent and correct, but logic, itself, is not omnipotent in humans’ affairs. I wonder if Klara would agree that truth can’t be rude and insensitive, that rudeness is based on meanness while insensitivity is based on wrong perception. With Rosa, as with many other people, Klara was not mean-spirited but rather sincere and useful to Rosa (remember Gricean maxims of good communication: be truthful, be informative, be relevant, and be clear?) (Grice, 1975). Arguably, Klara fulfilled all of these maxims in communication with Rosa, but we, — my wife, my grandma, and I, — argued that it was not enough. Of course, Klara’s observational judgment that Rosa looked like a cow in the new dress could have been wrong, but we did not challenge Klara’s professional fashion judgment – we agreed with Klara that the new dress did not suit Rosa well. My wife and I were concerned not with truth of whether or not the new dress really suited Rosa (not with whether or not grandma’s soup is salty, using another example), but with something else altogether that may (or may not) be equally or even more important than concerns about truth in a given moment and circumstances. Besides truth, one can be concerned about psychological well-being of another person, as it is in the case of Klara, or about being appreciative of another labor as in a case of grandma’s over-
salted soup. Of course, the concern about truth can overweight these non-truth concerns. At least, this 'something else' has to be taken into account when a person provides a response. However, it is interesting for me in this example that my wife and I chose Klara's own way of delivering "mama-truth" to communicate to her about the limitations of this way of relating with people. We were telling Klara our bitter "mama-truth" in her face about possible reasons of why Rosa stopped visiting us. Not only did Klara use her logical closed-circuit to response to us, we used our logical closed-circuit to address her and show the limitations of using closed-circuit. The difference was that she believed in using logical closed-circuit but we did not. Was it our hypocrisy? Can issues of responsibility be talked through using logic? Could we defeat Klara using her own weapon? Using Audre Lorde's (1984) famous phrase, "Can master's tool to be used to dismantle the master's house?" Lorde thought it can't but Lisa Delpit (1995) thinks it can. Could we present our objections to Klara in a different way without using her telling-mama-truth-to-your-face logical way? If so, what might it be? Should teachers tell their students mama-truth about their deficits in their face? Why? Why not? What are alternatives? Finally (for now), does presentation of truth affect the truth itself?

My reader, if my excerpt, or I, managed to engage you in wonders and considering interesting issues that you want to address to me, Klara, my wife, silent Tanya, Grice, Lorde, Delpit, and other people that I did not mentioned above, my example of ontological dialogue has been successful, but if not, than, sorry, it was not successful. As a successful example, ontological dialogue does not exist without your, reader's, engagement becoming interested in this story and its discussion and wanting to respond to it. I used my case because I thought it would be easier to engage you in a puzzlement (but I could be wrong – if so, sorry). However, sociolinguists (and Bakhtin) used very mundane, almost dull, trivial examples to discuss and analyze ontological dialogue (see, for example, Linell, 1998). See the following examples from Bakhtin,

"...in the ordinary speech of our everyday life such a use of another's words is extremely widespread, especially in dialogue, where one speaker very often literally repeats the statement of the other speaker, investing it with new value and accenting it in his own way—with expressions of doubt, indignation, irony, mockery, ridicule, and the like (Bakhtin, 1999, p. 194).

The embedding of words and especially of accents from the other's rejoinder in Makar Devushkin's speech is even more marked and obvious in the second of the quoted passages. The words containing the other's polemically exaggerated accent are even enclosed here in quotation marks: "He's a copying clerk . . ." In the preceding lines the word "copy" is repeated three times. In each of these three instances the other's potential accent is present in the word "copy," but it is suppressed by Devushkin's own accent; however, it becomes constantly stronger, until it finally breaks through and assumes the form of the other's direct speech. We are presented here, therefore, with gradations of gradual intensification in the other's accent: "I know very well, of course, that I don't do much by copying . . . [then follows a reservation—M. B.] Why, what if I am a copying clerk, after all? What harm is there in copying, after all? "He's a COPYING clerk!" . . ." We have indicated by italics and underscoring the other's accent and its gradual intensification, which finally dominates utterly the line of discourse enclosed in quotation marks. But even in these final words, obviously belonging to the other, Devushkin's own voice is present too, for he polemically exaggerates the other's accent. As the other person's accent intensifies, so does Devushkin's counter-accent (Bakhtin, 1999, pp. 208-209).

The notion of ontological dialogue reminds me of a quantum particle that is both localized and distributed. Ontological dialogue is localized in the events – it is always here-and-now (like a particle).
But it is also distributed in time and space – it does not have a beginning or end (like a wave). It does not have cause or genesis,

Another important feature of the [ontological – EM] dialogue is this it knows neither genesis nor causality. Dostoevsky, writes Bakhtin, did not use such a fundamental German classical philosophy category as becoming or evolution. For him, the central philosophical categories were such notions as coexistence and interaction (Bakhtin, 1999, p. 28). Drawing from Dostoevsky, Bakhtin questioned the relevance of dialectics when it comes to a finalizing synthesis of contradictions and differences. This was not a particularly safe thing to do in a thoroughly Marxist and therefore "dialectic" country. For Bakhtin, differences never fully merge, instead, they coexist in an engaged interaction. Dostoevsky, an embodiment of dialogical thinking for Bakhtin, saw everything as coexisting in one single moment. He could only understand the world as coexistence of different things. This does not mean that Bakhtin denied the importance of change. What he rejected was the ideas of genesis, where the past determines the present. He also rejected the reduction of difference (synthesis) as the end of development. Dialogue does not reduce plurality of human worlds and yet it connects various parts of this plurality (Sidorkin, 1999, p. 18).

Studying and revealing ontological dialogue means to engage in it and change it. It cannot remain the same, it is always contaminated by new understanding that the researcher brings, by the researcher addressing and replying to its participants since, a case of ontological dialogue is in the researcher’s response provoked by the presented case and its participants. Inter-observational consensus is not a proxy of the validity of interpretation anymore as in traditional research is. An interpretation is validated through its testing and depth, – i.e., through internally persuasive discourse involving agreements, disagreements and changing topics. Ontological dialogue requires very different orientation from traditional social research. It is dialogic subject-oriented and voiced, rather than silent, voiceless object-oriented (Bakhtin, 1986).

Kiyo Miyazaki’s response to Eugene Matusov’s arguments on ontological, epistemological, and instrumental dialogic pedagogy
(by Kiyotaka Miyazaki)

From here, I will describe my responses to Eugene’s arguments on ontological, epistemological, and instrumental dialogic pedagogy. Eugene’s arguments are divided into two issues. One is about the opposition between instrumental dialogic pedagogy and ontological dialogic pedagogy, and the other is about the opposition between ontological dialogic pedagogy and epistemological dialogic pedagogy. However, I cannot respond to these two issues separately because I cannot agree with Eugene’s distinction between the three types of dialogic pedagogies as mutually exclusive categories in the first place. So, I will start my response by sharing my perspective on ontological, epistemological and instrumental dialogue. First, I will show my view on the relationship between “ontological” and “epistemological.” Then, I will comment on Eugene’s critique of his so-called epistemological dialogical pedagogy. Finally, I will argue my view on the instrumentality of the dialogic pedagogy and comment on his critique of his instrumental pedagogy.
Kiyo’s view on “ontological”, “epistemological” and “instrumental”

Ternary relationship

Eugene treats these three as mutually exclusive categories. I see these three as three aspects of a relation among people. The relation among people can be either dialogic or monologic. More precisely, dialogic and monologic are two poles of a continuum and a persons' relation can be one in between dialogic and monologic. Furthermore, a relation between persons is not just a relation between persons at its two poles. The relation between persons should be understood as a three-term relation or ternary relation. The third term is the world that surrounds the people. A person (or a party) at each pole of a relation not only has a relation to each other, but a unique relation to the world.

Let me describe the ternary relation in detail. Regardless of whether it is dialogic or monologic, any relation between person A and B is a relation between A’s relation to the world and B’s relation to the world. People do not exist in a vacuum. A person’s experience means that she/he works on, and is worked on, by the surrounding world. Some objects are shared between two people. Some objects are not. When two people share nothing in the surrounding world, there is no relation between the two people. Even when two people share a part of the surrounding world, there is a possibility in which these two people have a different relationship to that part. Loving. Hating. Fighting with. Ignoring. Cheating. Working together. Teaching. Being taught. Discussing. Any relation is a ternary relation. Even with love, that makes a person blind, there is a world surrounding the two people in love, as the third term. A person falls in love with the other, attracted by his/her attitude and actions toward the world. Two people who are in love are sharing with not only each other, but also the surrounding world.

Developmental psychologists emphasize the importance of the ternary relationship among a child, a caretaker, and objects in the world. An example of this is the development of representation in early childhood. One area of research is about the secondary intersubjectivity. Trevarthen and others are studying the developmental change of an infant’s awareness of self and others, which they call the shift to the secondary intersubjectivity (e.g., Treverthen & Hubley, 1978). This developmental level is defined as an infant’s coordination and sharing with adults his/her attentions, feelings and intentions toward a third pole of an object, event, and action (Fogel & DeKoeyer-Laros, 2007). The importance of the joint-attention is also shown in other areas of child development like language acquisition (Scaife & Bruner, 1975).

I do not know whether Bakhtin or other researchers of dialogue explicitly analyze the dialogic relation as ternary one. There is a third term of the world in relation to two people or two camps regardless of whether it is a dialogic or a monologic. Three relations in a ternary relationship will change together. Depending on whether the relation between two persons is dialogic or monologic, the remaining two relations will take a different form. When a relation between two people is monologic and one person controls the other, the controller’s view of the surrounding world is pressed on the controlled. In other words, the epistemological relation between the controlling person and the surrounding world dominates over the relation between the controlled person and the surrounding world. Bakhtin’s description about Tolstoy’s novel as a monologic one, cited below (Bakhtin, 1999) can be read as the description of the world surrounding the author and heroes as the third term of the ternary relationship.

That external world in which the characters of the story live and die is the author’s world, an objective world vis-à-vis the consciousnesses of the characters. Everything within it is seen and portrayed in the author’s all-encompassing and omniscient field of vision (Bakhtin, 1999, p. 71).
In a monologic novel, the author’s view of the world dominates. The Author decides how the heroes see the world. On the other hand, Bakhtin characterizes Dostoevsky’s novel as a dialogic one:

He (Dostoevsky) would have introduced the life and death of the coachman and the tree into the field of vision and consciousness of the noblewoman, and the noblewoman’s life into the field of vision and consciousness of the coachman. He would have forced his characters to see and know all those essential things that he himself - the author - sees and knows. He would not have retained for himself any essential authorial “surplus” (essential, that is, from the point of view of the desired truth). He would have arranged a face-to-face confrontation between the truth of the nobleman and the truth of the coachman, and he would have forced them to come into dialogic contact [omitted,] and he would himself have assumed, in relation to them, a dialogic position with equal right (Bakhtin, 1999, p.72).

A dialogic author does not have a monopoly on the worldview. Her/his worldview shares equal right with the hero’s worldview. Each participant can enjoy his or her own worldview.

The way in which the participants share the world, as the third pole, is the deciding factor about the extent to which the people’s relationship can be characterized as dialogic. This must be the central issue for the study of dialogic pedagogy and the dialogue in general.

Relation between ontology and epistemology

Ontology, epistemology and instrumentality are three aspects, or characteristics of the ternary relationship between two people and the world. Instrumentality has a little bit different of a characteristic than the other two, since this characteristic emerges when someone intentionally uses the ternary relationship to achieve some purpose. So, I will first discuss the ontological and epistemological aspects of the ternary relationship and comment on the instrumental aspect later. My view is that the ontological and epistemological aspects always coexist and relate closely in the ternary relationship regardless of whether it is dialogic or monologic.

I will first characterize what “ontological” and “epistemological” mean. According to Oxford Dictionary of English, “ontology” is “the branch of metaphysics dealing with the nature of being.” Human being as an animal is not a static being but an animate being. She/he is always working on other people and the surrounding world. So, the ontological aspect of the ternary relationship refers to ways a person works on the other person(s) and the surrounding world. The epistemological aspect, on the other hand, refers to ways a person is aware of the other person(s) and the surrounding world.

I use the term “being aware of”, or “awareness” in the sense of the founder of the ecological psychology James J. Gibson (1979). Not only human beings, but also animals, are aware of the environment. “Being aware of” implies not only conscious knowing but also unconscious knowing. Embodied feeling is an important part of this knowing. Eugene’s view on epistemology is too narrow, from my standpoint. He argues in the section of “Epistemological instrumental dialogic pedagogy” in the following way,

4 Someone might argue that there is the four - part relationship between a leaner, a teacher, a learner’s view on the world and a teacher’s view on the world in place of the ternary relationship. I do not take this view, because, first, there are not only epistemological relations but also ontological relations. So, relations are between people and the world, not between people and views on the world. Second, two people share the world and have different views on the shared world. Without sharing the world, there is no relation between people, either monologic or dialogic.
The Modernist Rational mind has to subordinate to the Iron Logic of the Universal Necessity and purify itself from any other irrational and corrupting influences like emotions, values, beliefs, responsibility, traditions, social justice, loyalties, vanities, reputations, and judgments (Matusov, 2014).

Here, Eugene identifies epistemological work as a purified rational reasoning process that follows the logical necessity. This definition is too narrow. Human being’s epistemological work, similar to environmental awareness, includes other work such as the embodied sensing and illogical feeling. Even emotion has an epistemological component. Frijda (1986) who defines emotion as “a change in action readiness,” points out that emotion has an experiential aspect that is “an awareness of some mode of action readiness of a passive and action-control-demanding nature, involving readiness to change or maintain relationships with the environment (or intentional objects generally.)” Not only emotion. Aesthetics is a human being’s awareness of her/his environment’s beauty. All human endeavors Eugene listed above as non-intellectual ones have epistemological aspects, if not a rational one.

Human beings’ epistemological functions can be divided into “purified rational reasoning” and other ones. However, a “purified rational reasoning” cannot work alone in human being’s epistemological activities. To understand something deeply, one should connect a purified rational reasoning about something with other types of reasoning. For example, embodied reasoning and aesthetic reasoning. This is particularly important in children’s learning in education, a point I will argue for later.

Working or acting as an ontological aspect and being aware of the epistemological aspect are closely connected and influence each other in the ternary relationship between two people and their surrounding world. Gibsonian perception researchers emphasize the importance of this connection. Gibsonian researchers name this connection “perception-action coupling”, “perception-action loop (Clark, 1997)”, or “perception-action cycle (Neisser, 1978)”. Gibson’s following phrase shows the basic idea, “We must perceive in order to move, but we must also move in order to perceive” (Gibson, 1979, p.223).

Some researchers name the action referred to in the last half of the above phrase as “epistemic action” compared to “pragmatic action” (Kirsh & Maglio, 1994). Human beings, even some animals, do not always only act for the pragmatic purpose of “here and now”. They sometimes act just for the epistemic purpose. Reed (1996) states as follows, “Although perception may well have evolved, at least in part, directly in the service of guiding activity, as any animal’s perceptual systems get more sophisticated, the animal can come to be aware of affordances other than those it is acting upon here and now” (p.98).

I cannot agree with Eugene’s claim that ontology has priority over epistemology. However, his assertion is certainly correct in one sense. As Reed argues (1996), animals acquire epistemological organ in evolution since they act. Animals must know the world in order to act in it. Still, this is one side of a coin. Animals must act in order to know. Sometimes, they act just to know the world. Epistemology does not subordinate fully to ontology.

Researches of Gibsonian scholars are almost limited to perception. Still, the idea of “perception-action loop” can be expanded to the epistemological functions, other than just perception. Eugene’s so-called “purified rational reasoning” has developed in evolution (and in cultural development) in order for human beings to act in the world. It also depends on action to work if not directly as the researchers of embodied cognition argue (e.g., Johnson, 1987). Though it is apparently “pure” and detached from everyday life, it cannot be completely off-line from the practical life of a human being.
Dialogic and monologic

Ternary relationship between two persons and the surrounding world can be dialogic or monologic. These two should be seen as two poles of one continuum and not as mutually exclusive categories.

A ternary relationship is dialogic when two persons experience “unfinalizability” in the sense of Bakhtin. Bakhtin described the relationship between polyphonic novel’s author and its heroes as follows.

The consciousness of the creator of a polyphonic novel is constantly and everywhere present in the novel, and is active in it to the highest degree. But the function of this consciousness and the forms of its activity are different than in the monologic novel: the author’s consciousness does not transform others’ consciousnesses (that is, the consciousness of the characters) into objects, and does not give them secondhand and finalizing definitions. [Omitted] It reflects and re-creates not a world of objects, but precisely these other consciousnesses with their worlds, re-creates them in their authentic unfinalizability (which is, after all, their essence) (Bakhtin, 1999, p.67-68).

On the monologic relationship, Bakhtin says as follows, “In a monologic design, the hero is closed and his semantic boundaries strictly defined: he acts, experiences, thinks, and is conscious within the limits of what he is, that is, within the limits of his image defined as reality [omitted.]” (Bakhtin, 1999, p. 52).

When two persons participate in dialogic relation, they continuously generate actions with new significance toward themselves, each other, and the surrounding world. This is the ontological aspect of the dialogic relation. They also continuously generate new awareness about themselves, each other and the surrounding world. This is the epistemological aspect of the dialogic relation.

When two people are in a monologic relation, they do not generate actions with new significance toward themselves, each other, or the surrounding world. Each, or both, participants fix the significance of their actions. Their awareness toward themselves, each other, and the surrounding world are also fixed. In consequence, there remains only one view dominant in the monologic relation.

I agree with Eugene to think that unfinalizability distinguishes the dialogic from monologic relation. However, Eugene thinks that it is the distinctive characteristic of “Ontological dialogic pedagogy.” For me, who thinks that “ontological” is an aspect of the relation that can be dialogic or monologic, unfinalizability is the distinctive characteristic of “dialogic pedagogy.” Since unfinalizability is the distinctive characteristic, the form of the relation is not relevant for the distinction between dialogic or monologic. Classroom based relations in the form of discussion or debate, do not assure that the class is dialogic. In the debate class for example, the focus tends to be to win or lose rather than to generate new questions (Tumposky, 2004). Such a class is monologic in the sense that only one voice dominates. I agree with Eugene that lecture class can be dialogic. He says that lecture can be dialogic when it is a long answer to students’ questions. Though I do not deny this, I also think that lecture can be dialogic when it generates questions in students.

**Eugene’s two characterization of dialogic pedagogy (ontological and epistemological) viewed from my standpoint**

So far, I have shared my view about epistemology and ontology as two aspects of the dialogic and monologic relations. Now I will examine Eugene’s two types of dialogic pedagogy: ontological
pedagogy and epistemological pedagogy. Though Eugene further divides epistemological pedagogy into instrumental and non-instrumental categories, I do not distinguish these two here.

What are Eugene’s two types of pedagogy? He wrote as follows, “The epistemological non-instrumental dialogic pedagogy prioritizes the intellectual sublime of the high culture.” The keyword is “high culture” and he contrasts “high culture” with “mundane”. Two terms are not clearly defined by Eugene. But his characterization of Bibler’s “School of the Dialogue of Cultures” as “the school of the dialogue of high cultures” suggests that he defines the term “high culture” as the contents of school subjects like sciences, arts, literatures, and so on. The term “mundane” probably refers to everyday life other than schools. These two terms can probably be characterized by the difference in the detachedness from the real world of practice. What Eugene names as “epistemological dialogue,” is dialogue in the world of ideas detached from the real world of practice. What Eugene names as “ontological dialogue,” is dialogue within the real world of practice. If education is the intellectual activities in schools, and pedagogy is the method to organize these activities, dialogic pedagogy becomes necessarily identical to the epistemological dialogic pedagogy in this theoretical framework.

A different picture is seen from my standpoint. There is an epistemological aspect in what Eugene names the ontological dialogic relation, or the dialogic relation in the real world of practice. Real world practice forms, and is led by, the epistemological function of the participants. The epistemological function, within the real world of practice, may not be a purified rational reasoning but embodied ones like an emotional feeling. Still, these are epistemological functions and lead the everyday practice. However, epistemological aspects of the everyday practice has a unique characteristic. Most everyday practices do not aim for the achievement of the epistemological concern. These activities aim for the achievement of the practical concern of the participants like their desire, demands, and interests. Epistemological function is just a means for achieving practical concerns.

Similarly, there is an ontological aspect in what Eugene names the epistemological dialogic relation, or the dialogic relation in the world of ideas from my standpoint. As I already noted, even the purified intellectual function depends on actions that some researchers call “epistemic action.” This action connotes not only the ideal action but also embodied action. As far as the epistemological dialogic relation has a component of action, it has an ontological aspect. It also has some attributes generally attached to action like desires and emotions. Intellectual curiosity is one of them. Ontologically, participants in this relation can be named as “intellectual inquirer.”

**About Eugene’s critique on the epistemological dialogue**

I will examine Eugene’s two characterizations, or critiques, about his so called “epistemological dialogic pedagogy.” First, he argues that epistemological dialogue does not involve an ontological meeting of the participants. As noted above, I think that Eugene’s use of the term “ontological” refers to participants’ life activities and various relations among them in the so-called real world outside of schools. Eugene’s use of the term “epistemological” refers to participants’ life activities and various relations among them in the world of ideas. So, his first characterization is the logical consequence from his views on two types of relations. However, is it possible to disconnect the activity in the real world from the activity in the world of ideas?

It should be emphasized that the activity in the world of idea is a necessary one for human beings. Even animals, other than human being have its precursor as Gibsonian scholars argue. Though such epistemic action is temporarily detached from the various kinds of mundane interests and desires, it is eventually used for expanding human being’s action in the real world.
Gibsonian scholars are not the only ones who argue the necessity of the epistemic activity in the world of ideas for expanding the activity in the real world. Wartofsky (1979) argues that there are three types of artifacts and it is the third type, which he named the tertiary artifact that is used in the activity in the world of ideas. Epistemic activities, using the tertiary artifact, are contemplation and/or aesthetic or disinterested perception. However, such epistemic activities are not fully detached from the real world practice.

If, as I claim, an ‘actual’ world is social-historical praxis, (technology, social organization, etc.), then the ‘possible’ worlds provide candidates for conceivable change in this mode of praxis itself. The perceptual alternative provides the possibility of a practical alternative, as, so to speak, a perceptual hypothesis (Wartofsky, 1979, p. 209).

The epistemic activity can expand the possibilities of activities in the real world indirectly as it is once detached from the real world activity and specializes in exploring the ‘possible worlds.’

The epistemic activity is not an escape from the real world. It is the activity with which animals and human beings necessarily have to widen the possibilities in the real world life. So, the epistemic activity is vital for school education. As Cole (1997) pointed out, school can be the tertiary artifact in which children can experience various kinds of possibilities for their future real world life.

Eugene's epistemological dialogue not only has indirect relation to his ontological dialogue as I noted above but also has its own ontological aspect since his epistemological dialogue is the activity of the epistemological being from my standpoint. In other words, it has its own “ontological concern.” Intellectual curiosity, as intrinsic motivation, is a typical one. Eugene says that he does not know how participants’ interests to the problem developed in Lakatos’ imaginary math classroom. He says he does not know how their interests are grounded in participants’ real lives. I think that problems in the classroom need not be grounded in participants’ real lives. What is important is if the problems in the classroom can stimulate the intellectual curiosity of the participants’ as epistemological beings. And the pedagogy’s important missions are to characterize such problems and to find out ways for generating such problems.

Eugene’s second characterization or critique of his so-called epistemological dialogic pedagogy is that it prioritizes the high culture and is interested in the mundane only because it can give the material and opportunity to move to the sublime. It is true that learning objectives of school education are mostly taken from high culture. The failure of his argument is his disregard for the importance of high culture for people to understand the significance of their mundane experience. In people’s lives, the high culture and the mundane experience are intrinsically connected. Not only can people’s understandings be enriched by their deep understanding of a mundane experience. The reverse is also true. Understanding high culture helps people to explore the significance of their mundane experience, which is hidden from them in everyday life. Appreciating the high culture like sciences, arts, and literature is not the leisure of the elite. The high culture is the historical product to make explicit the significance of the mundane experience motivated by Eugene’s so-called ontological concern. It has been produced by the abstraction of some kind of universality from the mundane, corporal experience. The lesson in the classroom can provide children a chance to learn the intrinsic relations between the high culture and the mundane experience.

Let me introduce one case to show the importance of connecting the mundane experience and the understanding of high culture in the classroom. It is an episode of a teacher’s understanding of a poem. The teacher studied the poem as a preparation for a lesson. This type of learning is called
Kyouzai-Kaishaku or "interpreting a teaching material" in Japan (Saitou, 1964; Miyazaki, 2010). The poem’s title is "Haru" or "Spring," written by Fuyue Anzai (1898 - 1965).

Haru (Spring)
Chouchou ga ippiki Dattan kaikyou wo watatte itta.
(A butterfly has gone alone over the Dattan strait)

Dattan strait is now called Mamiya strait and is between the Asian continent and Saklin islands, which belonged to Japan before the WW2. A more important fact is that the word "Dattan" sounds very heavy or solemn to the Japanese, and the sound reminds us something challenging and difficult to overcome, though most Japanese do not know its meaning. The poem can be, and is generally interpreted, to describe a little being like a butterfly challenging the difficulties such as flying over the strait.

The poem was published in 1929 and was avant-garde in its day. It is a typical “high culture” learning material. Yukio Tsukamoto, a principal of a Japanese elementary school and my collaborator in developing dialogic pedagogy, once had a lesson on this poem for 6th graders. He conducted Kyouzai-Kaishaku for the preparation of the lesson. He tried to understand this poem by connecting this “high culture” product with the mundane, real life episodes of his friends. So, his is a good case to analyze the relation between high culture and the mundane experience.

The poem is sometimes used as learning material in Japanese elementary schools. There have been many studies accumulated by teachers about this poem like the analysis of its linguistic structure or the analysis of its variants. These are "the high culture type" analyses of the poem as the high culture. These analyses are themselves not worthless and Tsukamoto learned about some of them. However, he turned his attention to the seemingly unrelated, real life episodes of his friends. In reading the poem, he was reminded of his friends’ real life episodes, such as retirement, changing jobs, and falling in love, and connected these episodes to the world of the poem.

Some comments will be necessary to help Western readers understand the following. Spring, the title of the poem, has some connotation for us Japanese. Since the end of March and the beginning of April marks both the beginning and end of the school year and fiscal year for companies and the government, spring is the season for the Japanese to leave old communities for their new lives.

In the following, I will share an episode Tsukamoto referred to in the letter he sent to his fellow teachers to tell them about his view of the poem. He introduced his friend Tsukushi (pseudonym in this paper. Names of another teacher and the elementary school are pseudonym too), a teacher, as follows,

There have been many happenings in these March and April. Most shocking among them was my friend Tsukushi’s retirement after 29 years long career as a teacher. His family said to him that he had worked enough and his brother living in his hometown said that he had done his best, he told to me. He said there have been many happenings in these 29 years and he had never wavered in his decision to quit the job and had worked cheerfully with his colleagues in the last weeks. So, some colleagues had been surprised with the announcement of his retirement at the last teacher meeting.

In Tsukushi’s letter, Tukamoto quoted, Tsukushi recorded his final day in school as follows,
At the last meeting, names of retirees of the year were announced. Mr. Iguchi, whose desk was next to mine, said, “Why didn’t you tell me earlier? You have been always telling me everything honestly, haven’t you? Why do you quit?”

“I am tired. There have been many happenings. Now I want to rest.”

“What did your wife say?”

“She did not oppose to my decision. She said, not to make her feel more painful.”

“How about your living?”

“Income will decrease so living will be harder. In the next year, all the children will leave home and be independent of us. I had worked hard for children. Now I do not hesitate to quit.”

He said goodbye to the children of the class as follows,

Today, I leave the school. In 3 years I have been with you, I have been experiencing a lot. I want to tell you this most. In your life from now, you would feel tough, feel hard and feel sad. You can rely on other people at these moments. Rely on friends, teachers and families. It does not mean you are weak. It is not a shame for you to rely on other people at these moments. Everyone has lived and will live in that way. I love this town. I love all people in Yamada elementary school.

Tsukamoto commented on Tsukuba’s speech to children as follows.

Only a person who has felt sad, felt the tender-heartedness of others and the importance of others, and had changed himself in his life can deliver this speech. I just want you to know how Mr. Tsukushi behaved in his retirement.

Though Tsukamoto noted his interpretation of the poem, I will omit it. What is important here is not the content of his interpretation of the poem but the fact that he tried to interpret the poem by connecting the poem with the seemingly irrelevant real life experiences of the people. Why did he do this?

For Tsukamoto, his friend’s experience shown in this episode was not irrelevant to the poem. His friend decided to go forth to the unknown future after the long agony he experienced as a teacher. For Tsukamoto, this situation of his friend overlapped with the situation the butterfly experienced in the poem. On the one hand, Tsukamoto understood the world of the poem by connecting with it the real life experience of the people. Tsukamoto made clear the significance of his friend’s experience through reading this poem. Many people would read poems and novels in similar fashion by connecting them with people’s real life experiences. This reading is effective because the high culture like poems and people’s mundane experiences are closely tied. The high culture, like poems, attracts people because these shed light on the significance hidden in the mundane experience of the people. Mundane experience is not just a material to understand the high culture.

Instrumental dialogical pedagogy

Let us turn now to the issue of instrumentality. As noted before, I do not adopt the category “instrumental pedagogy” as distinct from other types of pedagogies. Instrumentality is a feature of any relationship regardless of whether it is dialogic or monologic. Since the pedagogical activities are not natural phenomena, but are generated intentionally by human beings for some purposes, they are more or less instrumental. It is so even in the case that people’s purpose is to experience the dialogic relation itself.
Then, how about Eugene’s so-called instrumental dialogical pedagogy? He characterized it as the one that “services an effective means for non-dialogic ends” (Italic is mine). If his characterization is correct, this one should be named not “instrumental dialogic pedagogy” but “monologic pedagogy.” Maybe, what he calls “instrumental dialogical pedagogy” uses instructional methods like discussion and debates. But, as Eugene himself says, and I have already noted, whether these methods are used or not is irrelevant when defining them as dialogic. Regardless of the instructional methods they use, the pedagogies should be called “monologic” when they serve teachers’ preset “one correct end.”

The defining characteristic of a monologic lesson is the teacher’s act of presetting an endpoint. Still, whether the endpoint is preset at the start of the lesson or not, is not the discriminating characteristic between a monologic lesson and a dialogic lesson. Dialogic lesson needs some preset endpoint (most often set by teachers). What makes this lesson dialogic, but not monologic, is that, the first, preset endpoint is not an answer but a question. For a lesson to be dialogic, there should be a genuine question at the beginning. That question ignites the inquiry process in the class and makes the lesson dialogic. The question should not be the so-called known-information-question that the teacher knows the answer, but the one I call the unknown-information-seeking-question where the teacher does not know the answer before the class (Miyazaki, 2011).

The second characteristic of a dialogic lesson is that the question changes throughout the lesson. In other words, both students and teacher, through their dialogue, discover new questions or new implications of the first question throughout the lesson. Dialogic questioning unfinalizes itself and the inquiry. This is the real hallmark of a dialogic lesson.

Let me show you one episode from Tsukamoto’s class lesson about the previously referred to poem. Since the poem was written in the 1920s, the notations of the characters for “chouchou” or butterfly are different from the ones used now. Children, even many adults, cannot read the notations used in the poem as “chou-chou,” butterfly in Japanese. They read them as “te-fu-te-fu” which has no meaning as a Japanese word. So, the children did not know that this poem was about the butterfly when the class began. Tsukamoto asked children what the word “te-fu-te-fu” meant. This question was a simple, known-information-question.

The class divided into three groups regarding their answers. One answer was “a butterfly,” the correct one. The other two were fish and bird. Ten children voted for butterfly, eight for fish, and seven for bird. The teacher asked why they thought it was a butterfly. Some of her answers were as follows, “Because the same sounds were repeated twice in ‘te-fu-te-fu’ as in the case of ‘chou-chou.’ Because the title is “spring” and a butterfly starts flying in spring.”

The teacher asked the same question again. This time, the answer “butterfly” became the majority (19). Nine voted for fish, and three for bird. Teacher asked why some children thought it was a fish. One answered as follows, “Because this one had gone over the strait that bird cannot.”

Following this answer, the teacher gave some explanation about a strait in general and the Dattan strait in particular. He said, “A strait is a sea between two places, between an island and a continent or between an island and an island. For example, the Tsugaru Strait is between Honshu Island and Hokkaidou Island. Mamiya Strait (Dattan Strait) is between Sakhalin Island and the continent.” Then,

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5 I named this type of question “the unknown-information-seeking question” in Miyazaki (2011). Recent analysis showed that the term “unknown question” is more appropriate than the former one to describe this type of question since it includes not only the question in which the teacher does not know the answer but also one in which the teacher does not know either its existence or its significance before the class.
the teacher again asked the same question and the result was surprising. Children whose answer was “butterfly” decreased to six and those who answered “fish” became the majority (more than 20).

Later, the teacher told the author who had observed this lesson that he had not expected such answers and hesitated about what to do in the next step of the lesson. Having the children discuss this issue was one possibility. Instead, he decided to give the children the correct answer, since it was still the beginning of the class and there remained many issues for the class to tackle. So he told the class, “This is not a fish but a butterfly.” But he didn’t stop there. He continued as follows, “Your thoughts are very good. Your thought is that a fish can cross the strait, a bird might not be able to, but for a butterfly, it is impossible to cross the strait. That thought is very good.”

The teacher’s response should not be taken as some kind of comfort for children who gave the wrong answer. This is an acknowledgement by the teacher that their answer is, in some sense, true. The answer “fish” is certainly incorrect as the answer to the question what has gone over the Dattan strait. However, when the children answered it was a fish, they must have felt that a fish can cross the strait, but a butterfly cannot. They must have felt that the strait is a difficult place for a butterfly. The difficulty of the Dattan Strait for the creature certainly pertains to the theme of the poem. The children must have grasped the difficulty of the strait intuitively. In the sense that the children correctly grasped this difficulty of the strait, their answer that it was a fish was correct. For many children, the teacher’s question was not about how the word “te-fe-te-fu” was read, but about what animal can go over such a challenging strait. To this new question, the answer “fish” was correct. In children’s apparently wrong answer, the teacher found out a new question that the children had generated. The teacher made it clear to the children and shared the new question with the children through his comments. A new question was generated in the inquiry of the known-information-question set at the beginning. Though this is a small episode, such a development makes the lesson dialogic. The absence of a preset endpoint does not make the lesson dialogic. Generation of the new question, in the pursuit of a preset endpoint, makes the lesson dialogic.

Eugene’s reply to Kiyo’s critique
(by Eugene Matusov)

Kiyo wrote, “I cannot agree with Eugene’s distinction of three types of dialogic pedagogies as the mutually exclusive categories in the first place.” I wonder if there has been some misunderstanding. I have never claimed that instrumental, ontological and epistemological pedagogical dialogues are in opposition to each other or are mutually exclusive. Kiyo wrote, “I see these three as three aspects of a relation among persons.” I agree. But, maybe, I agree with Kiyo only to a point.

In my second original essay above, I think I tried to make it clear that any ontological approach has an epistemological aspect while any epistemological dialogue has an ontological aspect, although there may not be enough to make this point clear as I argue that epistemology subordinates to ontology. The matter is rather complicated in my view. For example, Kiyo wrote, “First, he argues that epistemological dialogue does not involve an ontological meeting of the participants.” I both accept and do not accept Kiyo’s portrayal of my position. I disagree with Kiyo’s portrayal because any dialogue and monologue (even an internal monologue in solitude) ALWAYS involves an ontological meeting of the participants whether the participants acknowledge/value it or not. However, what I tried to say is that in Epistemological Dialogues (both I and II), ontological meeting of the participants is disregarded from...
pedagogical dialogue or bracketed as an annoyance. It is in this latter sense, I think Kiyo’s portrayal of my position is accurate.

Unfortunately, I did not make the non-exclusive relation as clear for instrumental and ontological dialogues, as I should have. Thanks, Kiyo for pointing at that omission in my text above. After Bakhtin, I argue that any dialogue (pedagogical or not) has all three aspects (actually many more), namely: instrumentality, ontologicity, and epistemologicity. What makes instrumental dialogue instrumental is NOT evidence of the presence of instrumentality but rather subordination of ontologicity to instrumentality, when dialogue serves for non-dialogic pedagogical (and organizational) purposes, losing interest in and respect for dialogic partners who often become either means or objects of pedagogical and/or organizational actions. Similarly, what makes epistemological dialogue epistemological is NOT evidence of the presence of epistemologicity but rather subordination of ontologicity to epistemologicity. In my view, to make a pedagogical dialogue ontological is NOT to purify it from its instrumental and/or epistemological aspects – not at all! Instead, it is about focusing on ontologicity as the priority over instrumentality and epistemologicity in dialogue while supporting both of these important aspects as needed.

I do not know if this clarification would satisfy Kiyo or not. I suspect that not completely but I can be wrong. My suspicion is based on his conceptualizing “ternary relationship” treating instrumentality, ontologicity, and epistemologicity as equal, if not, actually, prioritizing epistemologicity, while I do not. I strategically prioritize defining a human being as “being-in-the-world” rather than “knowing-the-world” (i.e., epistemological priority) or “serving-some-other-outcomes” (the instrumental priority).

I have found Kiyo’s new triangle — two people and an object — as the unit of analysis of dialogue as rather unhelpful. Elsewhere, I (Matusov, 2007b) argue against defining inquiry as “the search for the appropriate unit of analysis” since I think that a unit of analysis has to be specific to a particular inquiry and material at hand. I think the unit of analysis in a social science or humanity research should not be totalizing and comprehensive but rather contextual and authorial. Saying all that, I have found Bakhtin’s concept of “utterance” as his totalizing unit of analysis of dialogue more promising (for some particular dialogic investigations) than Kiyo’s “ternary relationship” that he may have borrowed from non-dialogic tradition of social sciences. I think it a step backward rather than a step forward as his triangle hides more than it reveals about the dialogical qualities of human interactions, relations, discourses, and activities such as addressivity, responsivility, responsibility, finalizing-unfinalizing, and so on.

Reading Kiyo’s critique here, and his other work, makes me suspect that he is a proponent of what I call “non-instrumental epistemological dialogue” (or the Epistemological Pedagogical Dialogue II). Thus, he wrote, — and I see this statement of a pedagogical belief as the birthmark of Epistemological Pedagogical Dialogue II, “Understanding the high culture helps people to explore the significance of their mundane experience hidden from them in everyday life.” In my view, sometimes it is true and sometimes it is not. Sometimes the exact reverse is true: it is the low culture that can help to understand and ground the high culture (see my example of Thomas Jefferson’s hold on mundane slavery above). Even more, I insist that understanding of the high culture, which is usually rooted in the past ontology (especially in school), can ONLY ACCIDENTALLY and PARTIALLY help “people to explore the significance of their mundane experience hidden from them in everyday life.” Yes, the high culture can be relevant and inspiring but it’s relevance and inspiration are always limited by the mundane demands of the physical, semiotic, relational, emotional, and ethic unique here-and-now. I do not want to disvalue the high culture

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6 That is why I oppose to so-called “outcome-based education.”
7 The other triangles as unit of psychological analysis can be found in Marx, Köhler, Vygotsky, Leont’ev, Engeström (along, probably, to many others). I suspect (i.e., hypothesize) that the triangle-like unit of analysis originates in Hegel’s dialectical philosophy focusing on mediation but this needs more investigation.
but I want to find its limits and elevate the importance of the mundane life that is often disvalued, bracketed, and illegitimate in both conventional and many innovative schools.

As local instructional moves, I have nothing against the instrumental use of low culture as a way for teachers to make the study of high culture more relevant, comprehensible, and engaging for students. Also, I am not against an instrumental use of the high culture for understanding the low culture. Both instructional moves were presented in the movie “Freedom Writers” (DeVito, et al., 2007) dramatizing the real events of an innovative teacher at an urban school (Freedom Writers & Gruwell, 1999). In this case, a novice English teacher in an urban LA high school (unsuccessfully) tried to use (I’d argue, exploit) the students' poor and violent backgrounds (i.e., the low culture) for teaching Homer’s Odyssey (i.e., the high culture). Her instructional move was unsuccessful, as her students recognized, rejected, and resisted the exploitation of their home cultures, but it doesn’t always have to be unsuccessful. Later, she rather successfully used the history of the Holocaust (i.e., the high culture) for helping the students deeply and critically reflect on their own racism and glamorized violent gang culture (i.e., the low culture). In general, I see both instructional moves as legitimate under certain pedagogical circumstances. However, what I view as problematic is educators’ overwhelming focus on teaching the high culture as the goal of education and, thus, pedagogically disvaluing the low culture. I am against excluding low culture from study for its own sake in its own material and its own discourse.

This credo of the monopoly and superiority of the high culture on reflection is, in my view, what catapults the Epistemological Dialogue II in education. I agree with Bakhtin along with Morson and Emerson that not only does the low culture provide the material and fertile ground for the high culture but at times the low culture (prosaics) can lead, can renew, and be superior to the high culture (poetics) (Bakhtin, 1999; Morson & Emerson, 1990).

In my view, the Aristotelian framework of ways of knowing may help to illuminate the flaws of the Epistemological Pedagogical Dialogue II that Kiyo, among other dialogic educationalists, seems to embrace. I found Aristotle’s four types of knowing most useful (Matusov & Brobst, 2013, p. 129):

Using Aristotle’s (2000) terminology, the ideology of the exact science focuses only on technological (i.e., skills detached from the purposes, strategies, techniques of dealing with things that can be different from what they are toward a preset outcome) and epistemological (i.e., the universal, objective, eternal truth, detached from any human subjectivity, – the truth of the necessity) ways of knowing. The ideology of the exact science project, articulated by positivism, describes the exact science as poiesis, in which what is considered to be good science must be and has been articulated in advance through the valid, self-containing scientific methodology. In contrast, the ideology of the humanitarian science also (if not mainly) focuses on phronēsis (i.e., practical, situated, participatory, perceived, embodied wisdom of local and unique possibilities – the truth of good possibilities) and sophia (i.e., philosophy; inquiries of the ultimate, “final damned questions” including existence, virtues, and goodness; examination of the world as a whole) (Bakhtin, 1999; Wiliam, 2008).

The Epistemological Pedagogical Dialogue II heavily prioritizes the epistemological way of knowledge (i.e., epistêmê) with its objective, universal truth and detachment at expense of, especially, phronēsis – practical wisdom in loci-- so rich in the mundane life of the low culture (although I argue that all four ways of knowing are present in the low culture).

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8 This discussion is relevant for developing the concept of “culturally relevant pedagogy” (Ladson-Billings, 1994; Lee, 2006; Morrell, 2002).
I charge the Epistemological Pedagogical Dialogue II with the following mutually related flaws:

1. Prioritization of knowing-in-the-world (epistêmê) over being-in-the-world (ontology);
2. Prioritization of epistêmê over phronêsis knowing of the world;
3. Prioritization of the high culture over the low culture;
4. Superiority of the schooled and, especially, schooled people (i.e., cultural elite) over common people (snobbism).

In sum, I’m not against studying the high culture – as a part of the real life; it can be a part of the curricula. Further, I also agree that sometimes studying of the high culture can help people to deal with their mundane life, although I respectfully disagree that the value of the high culture is only instrumental. Being an important part of human activity (and a cultural artifact), study of the high culture can, and arguably should, be for the sake of the high culture itself as any important part of human activity. The high culture can become ontological and meaningful for students no less than the low culture.

However, I respectfully disagree with Kiyo and other proponents of the Epistemological Pedagogical Dialogue II, that:

a) the high culture is intellectually, morally, or humanly superior over the low culture,
b) the low culture is incapable on its own reflection in its own material and discourse,
c) the low culture should be avoided, ghettoized in low prestige vocational training, or bracketed from education as valuable curriculum in its own rank,
d) the low culture has to be exploited for teaching the high culture through so-called "activation of prior knowledge" or used purely and exclusively instrumentally as Kiyo put it, “by connecting this 'high culture' product with the mundane, real life episodes of his friends” or for students’ engagement in the “high culture” curricular material (Matusov, von Duyke, & Han, 2012).

By excluding and/or exploiting the low culture, the Epistemological Pedagogical Dialogue II creates “teaching taboos” (Ayers & Ayers, 2011) against such important curricular topics, constituting the low culture, such as: sex, drugs, pop-culture, violence, vulgarity, profanity, contextualized interpersonal ethic problems and conflicts, social and historical injustices taken for granted, current societal and political tensions and controversies, current war conflicts, students’ personal interests and needs, their ongoing dramas and tragedies, common slurs and prejudices, social and political taboos, issues of human ecology, and so on. For example, in the late 1990s and the earlier 2000s, I debated the issue with my Russian Epistemologically-minded dialogic colleagues that studying the current mundane, controversial, “vulgar”, and messy Russian-Chechen wars was no less, if not, arguably, more important, especially for students in the Russian Federation, than the high culture, “noble”, and comprehensible Trojan War in the great epics by Homer (Matusov, 2009b). Expectably, some of my Russian colleagues from the School of Dialogue of Cultures approach, promoting the Epistemological Pedagogical dialogue, disagreed with me. I suspect that establishment and maintenance of the teaching taboos regime, promoted by the Epistemological Pedagogical Dialogue II, requires pedagogical violence (Matusov, 2009a; Sidorkin, 2002).

I agree with Kiyo’s judgment that instrumental dialogic pedagogy is essentially monologic – it is dialogic by its form, but monologic by its essence of promoting monologic relations. Thus, Instrumental Pedagogical Dialogue can be characterized as dialogic monologue – dialogic by the form and monologic by its essence. However, I think that the term “instrumental dialogic pedagogy” or “instrumental dialogue” is useful because 1) dialogic monologue is different from monologic monologue – monologic by the form and the essence and 2) these terms help to evaluate certain tendencies of educators who are interested in Dialogic Pedagogy.

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*An alternative way of conventional education dealing with the low culture is to de-ontologize it by teaching universal, decontextualized concepts like “bullying” or “safe sex” (Smith, 2010, February).*
Finally, I keep insisting that curricular endpoints preset by the teacher hinder a genuine dialogue (but never make a genuine dialogue impossible as a genuine dialogue can occur in any conditions however unfavorable). Kiyo wrote, “Dialogic lessons needs some preset endpoint, mostly by teachers. What makes this lesson to be dialogic but not monologic is that, first, preset endpoint is not the answer but a question.” Of course, a dialogic teacher may prepare some questions — although, I disagree that it is required for a dialogic lesson, — open-ended prepared questions are NOT endpoints10, by its very definition of being open-ended. Preset curricular endpoints are where students are supposed to arrive (always temporary, in my view). When students arrive at endpoints, known to the teacher in advance, as it seems to be in the case presented by Kiyo above, it still can be a genuine dialogue between the students and the teacher. What makes the difference between essentially monologic and essentially dialogic pedagogy is that in the latter case of a genuine dialogue the students’ arrival at the endpoint known by the teacher in advance is accidental or occasional and the teacher is open to the students’ (and his/her own) arrival at some other endpoint not necessarily known by the teacher in advance. Thus, in a genuine dialogue, my interlocutor may occasionally say something that I expect to hear from him or her or may arrive at a point that I might expect in advance. I argue that when this happens, these points known in advance represent the least interesting moments of a genuine dialogue. I think the difference is in presetting versus occasionally knowing the curricular endpoints, at which the students arrive, (and for the teacher to be open to know something different and new and to let the students legitimately disagree with the teacher and each other).

10 Unless their steering the students to some kind of the preset endpoint or block the students’ own inquiries, questions, and interests. In these cases, I wonder how much we can call these teacher’s questions genuinely “open-ended.”
Part II
The teacher as the dialogic author
(by Kiyotaka Miyazaki)

Now let us turn to the issue of the teacher’s location and role in a dialogic lesson. I believe that the teacher is the dialogic author and the student is the dialogic hero in a dialogic lesson. Or instead, I should say that teacher is the author and the student is the hero in a lesson regardless of whether it is dialogic or monologic, and the student becomes the dialogic hero when the teacher becomes the dialogic author so that the lesson becomes dialogic.

“Co-authorship” is another possibility that characterizes the teacher and students in dialogic lessons. In this view, the teacher and student collaboratively generate the dialogic lesson. Though I do not deny that the teacher and student work collaboratively in dialogic lessons, I do not adopt this “co-authorship” point of view. Why? As I argued in the section on instrumentality of dialogue, the classroom, as a pedagogical location, is organized intentionally by the teacher for the purpose of promoting student learning. It is up to the teacher to create lessons that are either dialogic or monologic. Although students’ contributions make the lesson dialogic as they work collaboratively with the teacher in the lesson, the final responsibility is the teacher’s. Only when the teacher becomes a dialogic author will the lessons become dialogic and the students become dialogic heroes.

How does the teacher become the dialogic author?

How can the teacher become a dialogic author? According to Morson and Emerson (1990), Bakhtin presented two types of methods the dialogic author/teacher uses. First, “he [polyphonic author, that is, dialogic author] creates a world in which many disparate points of view enter into dialogue” (Morson & Emerson, 1990, p. 239). According to Bakhtin (1999), Dostoevsky utilized the adventure plot as the arena for dialogue since such a plot stimulates the dialogue between its heroes:

In Dostoevsky, the adventure plot is combined with the posing of profound and acute problems [omitted]. It places a person in extraordinary positions that expose and provoke him, it connects him and makes him collide with other people under unusual and unexpected conditions precisely for the purpose of testing the idea and the man of the idea, that is, for testing the “man in man” (p. 105).

What is important here is not the adventure plot itself but the fact that it presents “profound and acute problems” to the heroes in which they encounter other heroes “under unusual and unexpected conditions precisely for the purpose of testing the idea.”

Second, the dialogic author is as “himself to participate in that dialogue” (Morson & Emerson, 1990, p. 239). In particular, listening to heroes is important for one to join in dialogue with the heroes. Dostoevsky’s listening as an author characterized by Bakhtin is suggestive:

Dostoevsky possessed an extraordinary gift for hearing the dialogue of his epoch, or, more precisely, for hearing his epoch as a great dialogue, for detecting in it not only individual voices, but precisely and predominantly the dialogic relationship among voices, their dialogic interaction. He heard both the loud, recognized, reigning voices of the epoch, that is, the reigning dominant ideas (official and unofficial), as well as
voices still weak, ideas not yet fully emerged, latent ideas heard as yet by no one but himself, and ideas that were just beginning to ripen, embryos of future worldviews. (Italics, original) (p. 90).

For Dostoevsky, the concept of listening is to listen for the “embryos of future worldview.” Listening for him is not just to understand others but also to understand possibilities latent in others.

Work of teacher as the dialogic author

Interestingly enough, there are two types of methods the dialogic teachers developed in the Japanese dialogic pedagogical views such as Saitou pedagogy (Miyazaki, 2010, 2011), which correspond to two types of methods of Bakhtin’s dialogic author. The first type is the teachers’ creation of “unknown question” which I cited above. This corresponds to Bakhtin’s first method in which the dialogic author “creates a world in which many disparate points of view enter into dialogue.” The second type is the teachers’ listening to the students. These two types are not distinguishable exclusively in the actual lesson, even though they occasionally overlap and interact. In some instances, the second type (listening) requires the first type (asking unknown questions) to work effectively and the first type occurs when the teacher commits the second type.

Unknown questions used in the first type are exactly “the profound and acute problems” Bakhtin described above. They place students “in extraordinary positions and provoke” and stimulate them to explore the initial questions as well as additional related questions. In addition, unknown questions stimulate the teachers to explore questions collaboratively with children. In this sense, creating unknown questions not only creates a world of dialogue for the students as heroes but also allows the teacher as the author to participate in the dialogue.

Teacher’s learning of the teaching material for discovering “unknown question” in it is called “Kyouzai-kaishaku” or “interpreting teaching material” in Saitou pedagogy as I introduced above. Saitou characterized “kyouzai-kaishaku” as follows:

First of all, a teacher should, as one person, encounter and wholeheartedly confront teaching material in all its respects [omitted]. A teacher should, as one person, wholeheartedly interact with the teaching material, analyze it, have questions about it, ask oneself, discover and create something new in it. Through these endeavors, the teacher can accumulate new questions, new thinking and new logic about the teaching material.

Only after the teacher has completed such an interpretative work on the teaching material, that is, only after she/he has encountered it, can the lesson have definite direction, intention and explicit, dramatic construction. This is because, only after such an encountering, the teacher’s knowledge about the teaching material transforms from being a collection of random pieces to a lively one acquired by their significant efforts. This is also because, after such an encountering, the teacher can make the children confront with the lively knowledge that she/he acquired by being excited by it, by doubting it, and by discovering it afresh (Saitou 1964, p. 89 - 90. Originally in Japanese, translated to English by the author).

It is generally assumed that teaching material used in early education is easy to understand and not worth the effort to tackle with all of one’s intellectual strength. However, Saitou pedagogy does not agree with this approach since it believes that a teacher can discover new, exciting questions within the apparently easy teaching material. To do so, the teacher has to challenge it with all of the intellectual strength she/he has as an adult.
Now let me discuss the second type of the dialogic teacher’s work: to participate herself/himself in dialogue, particularly by listening to students. The importance of listening to students is oftentimes emphasized by many pedagogical thoughts such as, Reggio Emilia (Vecchi, 2010). However, the nature of teacher’s listening to students has not been fully understood. In the dialogic classroom, the teacher’s listening to children cannot be achieved by understanding children “scientifically” through knowledge of developmental psychology. To understand children empathically is also not sufficient as a characterization of the essence of the dialogic listening. Simply speaking, listening to students is to discover the possibilities hidden within them, just as Dostoevsky listened to “ideas not yet fully emerged.” More precisely, a teacher should discover the new questions that are latent in students.

The typical example of this type of teacher’s listening is the lesson about the poem “Spring,” as I examined above. In this lesson, the teacher, Tsukamoto, discovered through the apparently incorrect answers of the children an unexpected and new unknown question. The question the teacher asked the children was about the meaning of the word “te-fu-te-fu” which was apparently the typical known-information question. However, any question potentially has an infinite number of meanings or queries from it other than the meaning proposed by its addresser. The children caught in the question a different meaning other than that which the teacher proposed, though they did not know it consciously. Listening to the children’s incorrect answers to his question, Tsukamoto became aware of the possibility of a new question and made it explicit to the children. This is a typical case of dialogic listening.

Tsukamoto had learned this method of listening through his long experience as a teacher and it was not assisted by any particular theory. However, there is one theory that suggests the possibility of this type of dialogic listening: Gadamer’s view of “dialectics of questions and answers” (Gadamer, 1975). In short, this theory states that to understand a particular thought, it should be interpreted as an answer to a question. Furthermore, another question should be discovered to which the first question is an answer. Thus, we need an infinite chain of questions and answers, or dialogue to understand a particular topic at a deeper level. According to Gadamer (1975):

To ask a question means to bring into the open [omitted.] The openness of a question is not boundless. It is limited by the horizon of the question. A question that lacks this horizon is, so to speak, floating. It becomes a question only when its fluid indeterminacy in concretized in a specific “this or that” [omitted.] It implies the explicit establishing of presuppositions, in terms of which can be seen what still remains open (p. 357).

The so-called horizon of the question determines the meaning of the question that I referred to above. Infinite horizons can be discovered in a single question and when a different horizon is selected for the question, the presupposition and “what remains open” of the question, changes. Consequently, the correct answer, as well as the wrong ones, for the same question also changes. Gadamer (1975) further stated, “To understand meaning is to understand it as the answer to a question” (p.368).

Based on Gadamer’s assertions, we can derive the following. Student’s “incorrect answers” to a question are incorrect only in the sense that a teacher’s horizon of the question is different from students’ horizon of the same question. There must be some horizon for the question on which student’s apparently incorrect answer becomes correct. Discovering such a horizon about the question in student’s answer is the work of the teacher conducted through dialogic listening. Since the student is not necessarily aware of the horizon she/he has on a question, it is up to the teacher as the dialogic author to be aware of the possible horizon the students have and to make it explicit to the student.
**Being the dialogic hero in a lesson**

I sometimes meet resistance from other researchers when I argue that the teacher is the dialogic author and the students are dialogic heroes. This resistance might be based on their understanding that such heroes are subservient to authors meaning that these students have no agency at all. This understanding would make the “co-authorship” view more attractive than the “student as heroes” view. However, this is a misunderstanding. If the hero is understood in the Bakhtinian sense then the hero, who is subservient to the author, is not the hero but one of two types: the monologic hero. There is another type of hero: the dialogic one. The dialogic hero, who is not controlled by the author, is characterized by Bakhtin (1999) as follows:

Thus the new artistic position of the author with regard to the hero in Dostoevsky’s polyphonic novel is a fully realized and thoroughly consistent dialogic position, one that affirms the independence, internal freedom, unfinalizability, and indeterminacy of the hero. For the author the hero is not “he” and not “I” but a fully valid “thou”, that is, another and other autonomous “I” (“thou art”). The hero is the subject of a deeply serious, real dialogic mode of address, not the subject of a rhetorically performed or conventionally literary one. (p.63)

The situation is the same in the pedagogic world in which the student becomes the dialogic hero when the teacher becomes the dialogic author. When encountered with a teacher as a dialogic author, students’ utterances are unexpected for both the teacher and themselves. In doing so, the students reveal an “independence, internal freedom, unfinalizability, and indeterminacy.” To be a dialogic author in the future, a student needs to gain experience by being a dialogic hero in a world created by the teacher. If the student can be a dialogic author, without assistance from the teacher at the outset, then they do not need to enter into the so-called pedagogic world.

How does a student experience being a dialogic hero? To answer this question, I will share an example of a lesson in an elementary school in which the question was: What is a store? Katsuhiko Sakuma, a researcher in social studies education, developed this particular teaching material and conducted class lessons at various grades in elementary schools (Sakuma, 1992; Miyazaki, 2010).

According to the *Oxford Dictionary of English*, a store is “a place where things are kept for future use or sales.” The definition appears to be very clear, so that this question looks to be a typical “the known-information question” when asked in the classroom. But is it really so? Would this be the same for a vending machine: is it a store or not? What about a self-service laundry? Is a peddler also a store? In the definition cited above, the store is defined as “a place.” Based on this definition, a vending machine is not a store since it is not a place, while a peddler is not a place but a human being.

However, there are certainly some commonalities between a grocery store, a vending machine and a peddler. How can we characterize the commonalities? At least in Japanese commercial law, there is no clear definition of a “store.” When asked by Sakuma, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, the office, which regulates the commercial activities in Japan, could not answer the question if a vending machine was in fact a store. Such difficulty of characterizing the concept of a “store” is not accidental since it reflects the rapid transformation commercial activities are undergoing in these days, especially when various types of new stores, which are different from traditional stores in many aspects, are being established. So, this question is the unknown question that has a certain value that needs to be explored in the lesson, contrary to its apparent ease.
Sakuma presented five photos at the beginning of his lesson; a grocery store, a barbershop, a self-service laundry, a vending machine, and a peddler. Then he asked the students whether or not these could be called a "store." Most students believed that the answers were easy. For example, a grocery store was a store while a vending machine was not. In the lesson, which I observed, the reasons included: "because there is no employee," "because there is no building," and "because it is a self-service." However, one student stated contrary saying that it was a store because owner of the machine could receive money from the sales. One student responded by stating that it was not a store because goods were often "sold-out" in a vending machine. The other objected to it stating that items in grocery stores also become "sold-out." The students also had discussions on the topics of self-service laundries and peddlers. Though the number of students who said that these three were a store increased, the students could not reach an agreement by the end of the lesson. Sakuma closed the lesson by requesting that the students go home and ask adults the same question to examine additional points of view.

In this case, Sakuma's lesson was dialogic in the sense that he created a world of dialogue by presenting unknown questions to the students. Then, how did students experience being the dialogic heroes? After the lesson, one student commented, "Before the lesson, I thought that it was not a store if there was no employee. Now, I am not sure. I had thought that a self-service laundry was not a store though it is inside a building and I pay money there. Now, I am lost" (Sakuma 1992, p. 38. Originally in Japanese, translated to English by the author).

This comment in which the student felt "lost" shows the change that she experienced during the lesson. At the beginning of the lesson, she believed that she fully understood the meaning of a "store." In Bakhtin's terms, her understanding of a store was finalized. By the end of the lesson, her opinion had changed since her understanding of stores had become unfinalized and indeterminate. This unfinalization of her knowledge had become possible in the exploration of the unknown question posed by the teacher as the dialogic author. This is a typical example of a student's experience as a dialogic hero in which the student, as the dialogic hero, encounters different views from other students as other heroes. The encounters make it possible for students to strengthen old beliefs or develop individual views based on their former beliefs, resulting in the construction of new beliefs. Or, as it happened in the episode above, the students ultimately felt doubtful and "lost" about their former beliefs. In any case, these encounters make it possible for the student to unfinalize their "finalized" understandings of the original question. At the same time, the finalized question becomes the question again.

Learners are not heroes and heroines of their teacher’s polyphonic teaching: A reply-disagreement to Kiyo

(by Eugene Matusov)

Dear Kiyo—

Let me start my reply to your very helpful and thoughtful essay with appreciation and agreement and then move to my respectful disagreements with your fruitful dialogic position. As far as I know, independently from Timothy Lensmire (1997), like him, you try to translate Bakhtin’s literary analysis of Dostoevsky’s polyphonic novels into the educational concept of polyphonic teaching. Specifically, both Tim and you have claimed that the educational relationship between the teacher and the student is parallel to the literary relationship between the author of a novel and his/her novel characters (i.e., literary "heroes” and “heroines”). I have found this move to be extremely useful and productive, although, at the
end of the day, I do not fully agree with it. I highly appreciate your and Tim’s conceptual claim exactly because it helps me articulate my own position in dialogic disagreement with and response to it and, thus, I see you as not necessarily willing, but still co-authors of my own position, with which you disagree. I am not sure I would be able to articulate my position without you. Thanks a lot for that.

I agree with the following points that you have made or are consequential of your position:

1) I strongly agree with you and Tim that the teacher is an author. As I argue elsewhere (Matusov, 2011a; Matusov & Brobst, 2013), any teaching, monologic or dialogic, is authorial both from a pedagogical point of view (i.e., how to teach better his or her students this particular curricular material) and an epistemological point of view (i.e., how to know better for the teacher as a learner him/herself and with the students) (Matusov, 2009a). I do not need to articulate this position more because I believe that you articulated this argument very well in your essay and previous work (Lensmire, 1997; Miyazaki, 2011).

2) I agree with both of your arguments for dialogic relations between the teacher and the student. Both you and Tim (Lensmire, 1997) have identified several qualities of these dialogic relations including:

   a. assuming by the teacher the non-transparency of students’ consciousness (i.e., not anything that a student does and says can be understood by the teacher for cultural and personal reasons) (cf. Matusov, 2011b);
   b. accepting legitimacy of students’ not wanting their teachers to follow the meaning of their work or contributions (i.e., a student’s insistence on privacy of his/her thoughts and contributions at times);
   c. focusing on promoting students’ responsive authorship – students’ creative inquires and contributions in response to the teacher’s dialogic provocations (cf. Matusov, 2011a; Matusov & Brobst, 2013),
   d. The teacher can present “puzzles” to the children, that is, the teacher discovers the kernel in the teaching material and produces a stimulating question about it, which is called yusaburi, and literally means “shaking up.” When children maintain certain views of the teaching material, especially commonsense views, the teacher intentionally presents different views, if not his/her own voice, then in contrast to the children’s view to make them rethink their fixed views. So in Saitou pedagogy, the teacher sometimes intentionally opposes the children. In this regard, the Saitou teacher is completely different from “the teacher as a facilitator of student-initiated inquiries”—the view common to some American educational researchers (Miyazaki, 2011, p. 40, italics is original);
   e. careful listening to the students and engaging with the students in a genuine non-known information seeking dialogue,

   I compare the teacher in Saitou pedagogy to the author of polyphonic novels, as Bakhtin described in his essay on Dostoevsky (Bakhtin, 1999; Miyazaki, 2009). Children in the Saitou classroom can be compared to the heroes of a polyphonic novel. Contrary to heroes in a monologic novel, in the polyphonic novel, heroes generate voices new even for their author, and can oppose the author. However, it is the author who controls the heroes’ behavior. This is similar for the Saitou teacher. Children become dialogic learners only via the teacher’s interaction with them (Miyazaki, 2011, p. 40).

3) I agree, but agree only to a point, not wholeheartedly, that teaching involves certain aestheticization of his or her students treating them as characters, heroes and heroines, of the teacher’s own imaginary teaching drama called “lesson.” In my past work with Mark Smith, that we symptomatically called “teaching imaginary children” (Matusov & Smith, 2007), we analyzed monologic teaching in which educators are involved in, using Bakhtin’s terms about literary authorship (Bakhtin, 1999), excessive finalizing and objectivizing of their students. The educators, we described, made definite, high
certainty statements about their students and treated them as objects of their pedagogical actions. In our paper, Mark Smith and I called out educators for subjectivizing and problematizing their students, which, in my view, seems not dissimilar to your and Tim’s call for the polyphonic treating of students as active heroes of their teaching. We argue that it is OK for a teacher to finalize his or her students by making observations or predictions or inferences or having expectations based on the teacher’s prior experiences. However, it is very important to treat these finalizing views as temporary hypotheses begging for testing with the students; and others’ input rather than final true portrayal of the students’ subjectivities. Similarly, it may be occasionally OK for teachers to treat their students as objects of their pedagogical actions, but it is important to bear in mind that teachers primarily work with students’ subjectivities, which is not an object but rather a partner in dialogue. Finally, I agree with you that teacher’s dialogic aestheticization of students, based on problematizing and subjectivizing the students, does not suppress the students’ agency but rather promotes it (but only to a point, see below). On the contrary, by developing new, genuine, “unknown information seeking”, questions for the students and testing his or her hypotheses about the students in imaginary and real teaching drama, the teacher can actively promote students’ agency. In such a case, and as in literary dialogic aestheticization of a novel’s characters, the novel’s characters (and students) are able to surprise the author and be his or her partners in never ending dialogue. Educational dialogic aestheticization of students involves students being able to surprise their teacher and be his or her partners in never ending dialogue as you and Tim so nicely described in your scholarship.

4) I agree with you and Tim that some monologic and dialogic teachers treat their students primarily as heroes and heroines of their teaching (but I try not to be one of them 😊) equating the teacher’s “novelist’s power” with guidance,

One of the strengths of imagining the workshop teacher as a novelist is that it makes teacher power harder to ignore. For we think of novelists as moving with power in relation to their characters, as creating and controlling them, as writing them into roles within a larger creative design that determines who they are, how they act, what they will be. The roles that workshops offer student-characters are different from those offered in traditional classrooms. Workshop student-characters enjoy an expanded control over the topics, purposes, audiences, and processes they will take up in their school writing. This expanded control, however, does not escape or transcend the teacher-as-novelist’s plan, nor does it escape the larger context of schooling. Rather, the students’ expanded control is part of the plan. In other words students don’t escape teacher power in the workshop, they confront a teacher power pursued with different means and toward a different end (Lensmire, 1997, p. 383).

It is a good description of some espoused and in-action educational theories but, in my view, it is a misleading prescription. Here is where our disagreements apparently start.

I strongly, but respectfully, disagree with you, Kiyo, and with Tim Lensmire that teacher’s aestheticization of his or her students, even dialogic aestheticization, should be the primary means of defining the teacher-student relations in education. In short, in my dialogic teaching, I do NOT WANT to treat my students as heroes and heroines of my polyphonic teaching, rather I want to treat my students as authors authoring their own learning and lives — as learners who have the highest authority on their own learning (and lives) (Klag, 1994). My authorial goal as a teacher is to support and facilitate my students authoring their own education when it is needed and asked for. I believe that the parallel between literary artwork, studied by Bakhtin, and (dialogic) pedagogy has its limits. At some point, polyphonic teaching is not like polyphonic novel. Let me elaborate and justify my point of dissent.

11 I use the term “aesthetics” as a particular form of transgressional finalizing of the other after Bakhtin (1990). See Bakhtin’s notions of dialogic finalizing (Bakhtin, 1999) and also Mark Smith’s and my application of this notion to education (Matusov, 2009a).
First, I agree with Alexander Sidorkin that the importance of teaching is overrated (over-prioritized) in education (Sidorkin, 2009). Teaching is secondary in education. The primary focus in education is always on the learner’s own, autodidactic, learning and study (as specifically effortful learning). Teaching supports students’ autodidactic efforts when needed and asked for. Education can exist without teaching. What is important is not the teacher’s pedagogical and epistemological authorship but rather the learner’s epistemological and pedagogical self-authorship. The learner is always the primary author of his or her own learning – whether his or her teacher recognizes it or not. Authorship cannot be given to the student by the teacher but rather, it can only be recognized and promoted by the teacher. If a learner is a hero or heroine, he or she is primarily educational self-hero or self-heroine. The learner is firstly the hero/heroine for him/herself and only then for the teacher. Using literary metaphor, a learner is a hero/heroine of his/her own, not the teacher’s, novel. The teacher’s aestheticization of his or her students in not even secondary but, I am afraid, it is fourth in the row of pedagogical importance, after the learner’s self-authorship, learner’s self-aestheticization, the teacher’s pedagogical authorship, and, finally, the teacher’s aestheticization of his or her students.

Second, it can be true that both you, Kiyto, and Tim in the teachers’ treating their students as polyphonic heroes/heroines may promote students’ agency and authorship as you have convincingly described above and elsewhere (Lensmire, 1994, 1997; Miyazaki, 2011). However, in my view, this dialogic approach promotes mostly a particular authorship in the students – what I call “responsive authorship”, at the expense of “self-generated authorship.” Students’ responsive authorship is mostly promoted in response to the teacher’s dialogic provocations (and other students’ provocations that are often caused by the teacher’s major provocations). Again, your description and analysis above are good cases of students’ responsive authorship. In contrast, in my view, your dialogic approach seems to neglect students’ self-generated authorship when they assign themselves learning activities and send themselves on extensive learning journeys (or even have the opportunity to extend responsive authorship in authorial direction). As I described elsewhere there is no a clear-cut distinction between these types of students’ dialogic authorship but nevertheless they constitute distinguishing qualities requiring different, and at times conflicting, types of teacher’s support (Matusov, 2011a; Matusov & Brobst, 2013).

Specifically, as I argued elsewhere, teacher’s support of learners’ self-generated authorship requires that the teacher promotes learners’ freedom, involves legitimizing learners’ non-cooperation, non-collaboration, disengagement, and dissensus with how the learners and the teacher define learning, education, and the importance of education in the life of the learners. This respect for negative freedoms (i.e., “freedoms from” rather than “freedom for”) by the teacher, on which the learners’ self-authorship is essentially based, is essentially the teacher’s respect of the learners’ temporal, spatial, and physical freedom from the teacher. It is the teacher’s respect of the student’s agency shown through the legitimacy for the learners’ unilateral and legitimate dissociation and divorce from the teacher. Literary characters cannot leave the novel, and the novel writer, without the writer’s final consent. In a dialogic pedagogy exclusively focused on promoting students’ responsive authorship, students-as-heroes must please the teacher by accepting the teacher’s dialogic provocations and assignments,

12 I.e., searching for truth.
13 I.e., promoting their own learning.
14 Also, students’ aestheticization of the teacher and the teacher’s self-aestheticization have to be considered.
15 In my view, a teacher should respect a student’s existing and emerging agency rather than grant and allow it within the teacher’s own “novel” (i.e., overall dialogic provocation-assignment), like you and Tim seem to suggest, “We grant children a certain agency within the context of the workshop by allowing children’s interests, desires, experiences, to guide their own and teacher’s work but this agency might make it less likely that they gain access to resources they need to move with agency and power outside the workshop” (Lensmire, 1997, p. 388, italics is mine).
Now Anita had a problem, for she didn’t want to write about her father. Anita hadn’t spelled it out in her notebook, and Ms. Meyer didn’t know: Anita didn’t want to write about her father because he physically abused her and her brother. But how can she not write about this hot topic and still please her teacher, Ms. Meyer? And if she doesn’t want to tell Ms. Meyer about her relationship with her father, she can’t even reveal her real reasons for avoiding this topic (Lensmire, 1997, p. 383, italics is mine).

Anita, a student-heroine, of a novelist teacher, Ms. Meyer, in a writing workshop does not have freedom to walk away from the novelist teacher’s assignment or from the workshop itself (or from the school). In my view, learners can, do, and should be able to legitimately leave the educational drama (i.e., a lesson), prepared by the teacher, and leave the teacher. I insist that for promoting learners’ self-generated authorship, a dialogic teacher should appreciate both his or her learners’ take over of the curricula and instruction AND will to divorce the teacher. The latter can be especially painful to appreciate by any teacher, but still necessary.

I argue that in contrast to the responsive authorship that you, Kiyo, seem to embrace as the major dialogic virtue, learners’ self-generated authorship is essentially transcending and, hence, anti-aesthetic.\(^{16}\) Saying all of that, of course, the dialogic teacher’s aestheticization of his or her students can still be important even for promoting learners’ self-generated authorship through the teacher’s recognition and validation of the learners’ creativity of transcending the given. However, the teacher is not necessarily the only, or primary audience, for the learners’ self-generated authorship. The teacher can be the primary and/or only audience (besides the learner him or herself) but it is not necessary or, arguably, even desirable.

Finally, besides the listed agentive objections, I have a corporeal\(^ {17}\) objection against the unrestricted parallel between a polyphonic novel and polyphonic teaching. In contrast to literary novel characters created by, and living in, the writer’s imagination (and later in readers’ imagination), real students are corporeal and engaged in intense ethical responsibility based relationships with their teacher. Learners and their teachers share the corporeal, ontological world, full of ethical tensions and ontological at- and dis-tractions. Learners and teachers are both ontologically and essentially thrown in the world that provides them with limited control and demands responsibility for their own deeds regardless of the level of their control. I wonder if it is a legacy of the monologic chronotope of conventional education, uncritically accepted by you, Kiyo and, to a bit lesser degree, Tim, that education can be bracketed and purified from messy, disorderly (or differently orderly), and, at time, violent life, disputing the teacher’s “novel”, -- what literary writers can legitimately and successfully do and enjoy in their imagination, (but teachers of student’s with lives in and out of the classroom cannot). Such teachers have an illusion that they and their students essentially live only in the didactic space of the shared curriculum, instruction, and self-contained purely epistemological inquiries. Novelistic teachers often have an illusion of ontological control over the life of their classroom (and students). For literary authors, life usually interferes only after their literary imaginative work is done as it was unfortunately done in the case of the author of “The satanic verses” (Rushdie, 1989, 2012), who was persecuted for his writing by the Iranian theocratic authorities. In contrast to literacy artwork, in any teaching, life interferes all the time.

\(^{16}\) I have noticed that Bakhtin dropped the concept of aesthetics that he defined as finalization/consummation of the other, self, and the world in his early work (1990) when he moved to his dialogic framework (1999). I could not find in his later work, criticizing the concept of finalization, any dialogic reconceptualization of the notion of aesthetics and, thus, I suspect that Bakhtin consciously or unconsciously might come to a realization that the notion of aesthetics may be incompatible with the notion of dialogue. When I contacted a group of international Bakhtinian philologists on the bakhtin-dialogism@lists.shef.ac.uk list serv (July-August, 2009), they supported the latter suspicion of mine.

\(^{17}\) Again after Bakhtin, I argue that the notion of responsibility rooted in ethical tensions is essentially corporeal (Bakhtin, 1999, 1993, 1999).
and, in my view, dialogic teaching should appreciate and actively embrace it. Teachers do not have the luxury of temporally bracketing out real life, as writers do. The life in education is and should be deedful, ethically charged, and eventful with limited control by all the involved parties (i.e., students and teachers) for which they still must take responsibility. An author of a novel can kill his or her hero and it would constitute an aesthetic event, while harming a student would constitute an ethic, moral, and, potentially, criminal event for the teacher. Education cannot and should not be purified and aesthetized in the name of epistemology and high culture (you, Kiyo) or social justice (Tim). Education should be above life but also embedded in life itself. I argue that, in contrast to literary artwork, in teaching in general and in dialogic teaching specifically, the ethical teacher-student relationship focusing on responsibility for the teacher’s and students’ own deeds ("postupki" in Russian) should take priority over any aesthetic concern in teacher-student relationship.

What do you think?

My reply to Eugene’s comment about my argument on the learner as the dialogic hero
(by Kiyotaka Miyazaki)

I have already noted that I sometimes meet with strong opposition about my “the teacher as the dialogic author/ the learner as the dialogic hero” view, and the opposition is based on a simple misunderstanding on Bakhtin’s idea of two types of hero. Your criticism on my view is, of course, not based on this kind of misunderstanding. Though you avoid the term “hero” in your argument, your characterization of the learner as one having “the responsive authorship” seems to correspond to my characterization of the learner as the dialogic hero. I think this way because, in both characterizations, learners are thought to become an active agent in a lesson through the teacher’s work as the dialogic author. Maybe this claim is too rough and not acceptable to you. But let me suppose this way temporarily because there are other, more crucial disagreements between us other than this issue.

On the dichotomy between the responsive authorship and the self-generated authorship

Now let me discuss about these more crucial disagreements between us. The first issue is about your dichotomy between the responsive authorship and the self-generated authorship. Though you argue that there is no clear-cut distinction between these types of students’ dialogic authorship, you substantially describe these two types as mutually exclusive opponents. Moreover, you seem to argue that the promotion of the responsive authorship hinders the development of the self-generated authorship when you take up the example of Anita from Lensmire (1997). You argue that students must please the teacher in a lesson in which the teacher exclusively focuses on promoting students’ responsive authorship. You use the strong word “must.” However, you do not explain why the teacher’s effort to promote students’ responsive authorship necessarily positions a student as the one who must please the teacher.

Certainly, students sometimes try to please their teacher in a classroom, reading and following the teacher’s intention. In Japanese educational world, such students are called “Yoi – Ko”, or “a good kid” with the implication that they are really not good. Japanese dialogic teachers are very sensitive to such students’ behavior. For them, the appearance of this behavior means that their dialogic teaching does not work well. They want students to not fear anyone, including teachers (Saitou, 1969).
I cannot find out any reason to suppose that the dialogic author as I define her/him "must" produce "Yoi – Ko" students' behavior. Of course, students will have no chance to please the teacher if they have no relations to the teacher regardless of whether or not she/he is dialogic. However, such a teacher is already not a teacher. Generally speaking, when two persons have a relationship of any kind, there is always a possibility that one tries to please, or plays up to the other. To deal with these "good kids", the teacher should be sensitive to this type of students' behavior, and once after she/he becomes aware of an appearance of such student’s behavior, she/he should discover in the behavior of the student the germ of autonomy and help her/him to grow as an autonomous agent. Just allowing her/him to leave from the teacher does not solve the problem.

I do not think that the learner, or the human being in general, has two types of authorship, or agency. Human beings are an agent by nature. In the sense that no one can put agency into some other, agency of human being is self-generated. Simultaneously, agency in human being develops by interacting with other people. The learner can enter into the dialogic lesson and act as the dialogic heroine/hero because she/he is originally an agent. Her/his experience of being the dialogic heroine/hero in the dialogic lesson helps her/his agency grow up.

Can a lesson be purified and dissociated from real life?

Our second disagreement is about your “corporeal objection.” You mentioned that Miyazaki accepts uncritically that “education can be bracketed and purified from messy, disorderly (or differently orderly), and, at time, violent life." You also mentioned that the teachers Miyazaki introduced “have an illusion that they and their students essentially live only in the didactic space of the shared curriculum, instruction, and self-contained purely epistemological inquiries.” Sorry to misguide you as I did not describe these issues much so far, but these two statements are simply not the fact.

My description of the teacher as the dialogic author is based on the long time experiences of the Japanese teachers in, most cases, the public schools, and not a fantasy based on some theoretical considerations. These teachers do not have an illusion that their activities in schools can be done in some kind of purified space dissociated from real life. They cannot. They know very well that their effort to produce the dialogic lesson has only a limited influence on their students and their lesson is very vulnerable to the forces from the outside, real world.

Kihaku Saitou, one of the most influential teachers of the Japanese dialogic pedagogical school and to whom I owe much to the development of my own view of dialogic pedagogy, repeatedly expressed that the teacher’s work is frail. For example, Saitou (1963) said, “Education is powerless. Teacher’s work is frail and lonely” (p. 13).

Saitou’s statement has several implications. One is the vulnerability of teaching to various influences from real life. Saitou (1970a) said, “Education is dependent to politics by nature. It is most easily affected by powers outside of the classroom. So, it is natural that education is powerless to politics”(p.6). Not just politics. It is also vulnerable to the local community, parents, media, and so on. The real life outside of the classroom has many influences, good and bad, on the classroom, and consequently, what the teacher can do is limited. This is the unquestionable premise for Saitou and other Japanese dialogic teachers.

Saitou’s understanding that education is frail is concerned with teacher’s relation to students, too. Saitou (1963) said, “The teacher are oftentimes betrayed, criticized, and given a hard time by children on whom she/he worked with all her/his heart” (p.11). Saitou’s expression such as “the betrayal of children”
might make readers think that Saitou was a tyrannical teacher who wanted his children placed under his control. Definitely not. Saitou knew that people would view such expressions as haughty. Still, he argued that it is also natural for teachers as person to feel like that. This statement is a cynical way for Saitou to admit that children are autonomous agents whom the teacher cannot fully control.

The awareness of the teacher’s powerlessness did not make Saitou and other Japanese teachers give up effort to be the author of the dialogic lesson and leave everything to the learner. On the contrary, it is the springboard for the Japanese dialogic teacher to commit himself or herself to the teacher’s work as the dialogic author. After saying that education is powerless, he continued, “when the teacher becomes aware of her/his work’s frailness, powerlessness, and loneliness, she/he will acquire new strength” (Saitou, 1963, p.13).

Japanese teachers know that a lesson is not only vulnerable to the influences from the real world. Lessons also occupy just a small part within the learners’ activities in school, much less in their lives. Still, Japanese dialogic teachers believe that they should strive to make lessons dialogic, even if they are not sure if they will achieve this goal, because they believe that they can do something for the learners only in a lesson. Saitou described this belief in the following way. “The teacher does not need to take the responsibility for children’s future. She/he should take the responsibility only for each lesson” (Saitou, 1970b, p.234).

As for the content of the lesson, the Japanese dialogic teachers, and I too, believe that it is important for learners to learn your so-called high culture, or epistemological contents. However, I do not think that the learners in the Japanese dialogic lesson are fully shut off from your so-called ontological issue and the real life issue when they learn your so-called epistemological, high culture contents. As I have already noted in my response to your description of ontological dialogue and epistemological dialogue as mutually exclusive categories, I think that ontology and epistemology are two aspects of any relation between two participants. So, the relation between the learning material (like a poem) and the learner (and/or the teacher) always has the epistemological aspect and the ontological aspect. When the learner (and/or the teacher) takes some epistemological stance toward the learning material, she/he simultaneously makes some ontological commitment to the learning material. I have already introduced the case in which the teacher read the poem for preparing a lesson about it. In this case, the teacher interpreted the poem by connecting it with the lives of his friends and himself. This case shows that the apparently pure epistemological conduct of interpreting the modern poem, the typical high culture product, relates closely to the ontological conduct of examining how to live in the real life. In this sense, the Japanese teachers always try to relate the lesson in the classroom to the real life affairs of the learners.

**Final remark**

Finally, I cannot suppress presenting my basic question about your work. I cannot understand why you commit yourself to the pedagogy. As far as I understand, the pedagogy is the human endeavor to engage with others actively to facilitate their learning and the development of their agency. According to you, such an active engagement will hinder the development of his so-called self-generated authorship, and make people responsive. The learners who can leave the lesson by themselves and ask the “teacher’s” help will no longer need someone who tries to have the pedagogical relationship with them. They will be able to make use of anyone to get some help she/he needs when necessary. So, she/he does not need “the teacher”, much less “the pedagogy”. Then, why do you need pedagogy?
Your strong request to the teachers that they should allow their students to leave the lesson is not fully comprehensible to me. As Foucault (1995) stated in his argument about the panopticon, formal education has a feature that it disciplines people to be dependent to the powers that be. And there are many teachers who are not aware of that feature of school. They are not aware of their works’ frailness, either. They should be aware of the fact that their efforts with good intention often times make their students the monologic hero/heroine and deprive them of their chance to grow as a dialogic agent.

Still, I cannot accept your request to the teacher that the teacher should do nothing to the learner in the lesson except to show respect for the learner’s “freedom from.” Such a request denies the dialogic teachers’ continual efforts to make the lesson dialogic so that they can help the learners to be dialogic agents in school, which is today, becoming tougher for both teachers and students to engage in rich dialogic experiences. And denial as such will make the situation in schools worse than it is, just allowing schools to become monologic arenas dominated by monologic teachers’ voices, and through it the monologic voice of the powers outside of classrooms.

References


