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Uniqueness, Dialogue, and the Limits of Self-Education: A Critical Commentary on Matusov's "Against Equity"

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Abstract
This dialogic commentary critically and generatively engages with Matusov's (2026) conceptual proposal of a "uniqueness model" of educational justice as an alternative to equity-based frameworks. While affirming the author's insight that totalized paternalistic education suppresses students' authorial agency and that genuine education arises from self-direction and meaning-making, this commentary raises several substantive tensions: the underspecification of structural conditions enabling self-education, the risk of romanticizing learner autonomy in contexts marked by deep material inequality, the ambiguity of "negative liberty" as an educational foundation, and the need for a richer theory of pedagogical responsibility within the uniqueness model. Drawing on Bakhtin's dialogism, Dewey's democracy, hooks's engaged pedagogy, and post-colonial educational theory, the commentary proposes that the uniqueness model be complemented by a "dialogic accountability" framework, in which freedom and responsibility are co-constituted through relational and communal dialogue rather than treated as purely individual prerogatives.

Keywords: *uniqueness model, educational justice, dialogic pedagogy, self-education, equity, democratic education, dialogic accountability*

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1. Opening the Dialogue: What Matusov Gets Profoundly Right

Eugene Matusov's (2026) editorial essay, "Against Equity: Toward a Uniqueness Model of Educational Justice," arrives as a bold provocation within the field of dialogic pedagogy, a field that, by its very nature, invites dissent, counterpoint, and the collision of perspectives. The paper deserves serious engagement precisely because it challenges one of the most hegemonic discourses in contemporary Western education: the equity model of social justice. This commentary is written in the spirit of what Bakhtin (1999, p. 6) called a meeting of "consciousnesses with equal rights"—not to dismiss Matusov's argument, but to extend and complicate it through dialogic encounter.

First, I affirm the paper's core diagnostic insight. Matusov is correct that equity-based educational frameworks, in their dominant institutional forms, tend to presuppose a single set of desirable outcomes defined externally by teachers, educational experts, politicians, or school boards, not by students themselves. As he writes, the equity model strives to ensure "comparable educational outcomes by addressing systemic inequalities through differentiated support" (Matusov, 2026, p. E2). This standardization, even when well-intentioned, risks what Matusov calls "totalized educational paternalism," wherein the learner becomes a passive recipient of others' judgments about what is educationally valuable.

The fable of the Animal School (Reavis, cited in Matusov, 2026) powerfully captures this dynamic: each animal is injured and diminished by a curriculum designed for none of them. The Eagle, gifted in flight, is reprimanded "for employing its unique techniques rather than adhering to standard protocols" (Matusov, 2026, p. E2). This allegorical critique resonates deeply with what hooks (1994, p. 13) described as the "banking model" of education that Freire identified wherein students are empty containers to be filled by authoritative knowledge—and extends it to show how even progressive, equity-oriented frameworks can reproduce this logic under a different ideological banner.

Matusov's distinction between "learning" and "education" is, believe, one of his most original contributions. He argues that education requires not only that learning occur, but also that the learner notice it and "evaluates its content positively" (Matusov, 2026, p. E11). This phenomenological definition of education as ephemeral, subjective, and dependent on the learner's own evaluative stance is deeply consonant with a sociocultural understanding of meaning-making (Vygotsky, 1978) and with Dewey's (1916/1997) insight that genuine education is always an experience of growth, not merely an accumulation of prescribed knowledge. The case of the Gaga Ball Game Corporation at The Circle School illustrates how genuine democratic deliberation can honor students' diverse educational investments without reducing them to a single normative standard.

2. Tensions and Questions: Where Dialogue Must Push Back

2.1. The Structural Preconditions of Self-Education

My first concern is with what might be called the "conditions of possibility" for the uniqueness model. Matusov acknowledges, in his conclusion, that the uniqueness model requires "economic, political, and institutional support" (Matusov, 2026, p. E22) and that it is best supported by "abundance- and leisure-based societies" (Matusov, 2026, p. E22). Yet this acknowledgment remains underdeveloped. What does this mean for the vast majority of the world's learners, including children in rural Indonesia, sub-Saharan Africa, or the urban poor in the United States, who exist within conditions of profound material scarcity, where the freedom to pursue self-directed education is not merely limited but structurally foreclosed?

Bourdieu and Passeron (1990) demonstrated that educational "freedom" is always already structured by the habitus, the set of durable dispositions produced by social conditions. A student who has never been exposed to classical music, higher mathematics, or critical philosophy does not simply "choose" to ignore these domains; rather, material and cultural conditions shape their access to these domains, rendering such choices largely unavailable. When Matusov advocates for "negative liberty" (Berlin, 2017)—the freedom from external coercion in defining one's education he risks conflating the formal absence of constraint with the substantive capacity to exercise self-direction. As Sen (1999) argued in his capability approach to justice, freedom is meaningful only when it is accompanied by the real capabilities to exercise it. The uniqueness model, as articulated, does not yet provide a theory of how those capabilities are to be cultivated without some form of structured pedagogical intervention.

This is not merely a logistical concern. It is a philosophical one. As Noddings (2013, p. 1) reminds us, the ethics of care insists that relations of dependency and interdependency are constitutive of human

life, not aberrations to be overcome. A model of educational justice that begins with individual self-direction must grapple seriously with the fact that the self who directs is always already formed through relations of care, provision, and, yes, paternalism, both benign and harmful. The question, then, is not whether to provide structure, but what kind of structure honors rather than suppresses the learner's emerging voice.

2.2. The Risk of Romanticizing Autonomy

My second concern is with the romanticization of learner autonomy in the uniqueness model. Matusov draws heavily on examples from democratic schools, Sudbury Valley, The Circle School, and the Philly Free School as proof of concept for the uniqueness model. These are compelling cases. But they are also demographically particular: they tend to serve children from middle-class and upper-middle-class families, whose parents are ideologically committed to alternative education and who possess the cultural and economic capital to sustain participation in these institutions (Apple, 2019). To generalize from these cases to a universal model of educational justice risks what Giroux (2011) called "a politics of location," drawing universal conclusions from a highly situated and privileged vantage point.

Moreover, research on self-directed learning suggests that the capacity for autonomous educational decision-making is itself developmentally and culturally variable. Zimmerman (2002) found that self-regulated learning—a prerequisite for meaningful self-direction—requires metacognitive skills that are not innately given but must be cultivated through scaffolded interaction. Vygotsky's (1978) concept of the zone of proximal development suggests that learners often need the support of a more capable other, not to be told what to learn, but to discover what they can become. The uniqueness model must account for the pedagogical labor required to help learners develop the very self-directedness it presupposes.

I am also struck by a tension internal to Matusov's own argument. He acknowledges that the uniqueness model becomes illegitimate when self-education is "immoral or illegal," "exploitative," or pursued through "dirty politics" in democratic settings (Matusov, 2026, p. E18). But who determines these limits? If the answer is the democratic community—as the Gaga Ball case suggests—then some form of collective normative constraint is already built into the model. This is not a flaw; it is, I would argue, a productive opening. But it requires a more explicit theory of how individual uniqueness and collective responsibility are held together in pedagogical practice.

3. Extending the Argument: Toward Dialogic Accountability

3.1. Bakhtin's Answerability and the Ethics of Uniqueness

I want to propose that the resource Matusov reaches for—Bakhtin's dialogism—actually offers more than he has drawn upon. Matusov focuses on Bakhtin's (1999) notion of "consciousnesses with equal rights" encountering one another. But Bakhtin's philosophy also insists on the concept of "answerability" (Bakhtin, 1990)—the idea that uniqueness is never simply a privilege but always also a responsibility. In Bakhtin's (1990, p. 40) words, "I occupy a place in once-occurrent Being that is unique and never-repeatable... and in this place I am answerable." Uniqueness, for Bakhtin, is not the foundation for claiming freedom from others' educational designs; it is the source of an ineliminable ethical obligation to respond to and for others.

This Bakhtinian insight suggests reframing Matusov's project: rather than positioning the uniqueness model as a rejection of equity's concern for others, we might reconceptualize it as a different theory of how one's educational development relates to communal life. The student at The Circle School who wished to impose standard Gaga rules on all players was not exercising uniqueness; they were suppressing others' uniqueness in the name of their own preference. The school assembly's democratic

response was not merely procedural; it was a collective enactment of Bakhtinian answerability—holding individuals accountable to the uniqueness of others.



Figure 1. Dialogic Communication Cycle for Uniqueness, Answerability, and Educational Justice

Figure 1 illustrates the dialogic communication cycle proposed in this commentary as a conceptual extension of Matusov's (2026) uniqueness model of educational justice. The cycle visualizes how genuine self-education emerges not through isolated individual autonomy, but through ongoing relational dialogue

grounded in answerability, ethical responsiveness, and democratic participation. At the center of the framework is the principle of “relationship and meaningful impact,” emphasizing that educational freedom is always situated within social, cultural, and communal relations. Rather than positioning the learner as an entirely self-sufficient actor, the model conceptualizes self-education as a dialogically mediated process in which individuals negotiate meaning, responsibility, and educational direction together with others. The cyclical structure reflects several interconnected dialogic processes discussed throughout the article. The stages of expressing perspectives, seeking understanding, examining assumptions, exploring possibilities, co-creating solutions, and committing to action correspond to Bakhtin’s notion of dialogic encounter among “consciousnesses with equal rights” (Bakhtin, 1999). Simultaneously, the framework incorporates the commentary’s critique of purely negative liberty by emphasizing that autonomy requires supportive relational and structural conditions. In this sense, the cycle operationalizes “dialogic accountability,” in which freedom and responsibility are co-constituted rather than treated as oppositional principles. The inclusion of reflection, communal engagement, and ethical responsiveness also resonates with Deweyan democratic education, hooks’s engaged pedagogy, and post-colonial perspectives emphasizing relationality and interdependence. Within the context of dialogic pedagogy, the figure further demonstrates that educational justice cannot be reduced either to standardized equity outcomes or to unrestricted individual choice. Instead, the framework suggests that equitable educational practice involves creating dialogic conditions in which learners can author their own educational trajectories while remaining answerable to others within democratic communities. The model therefore serves not as a prescriptive pedagogical sequence, but as a heuristic representation of how uniqueness, care, dialogue, and collective responsibility may interact within self-educational environments.

3.2. A Post-Colonial Interlocution

A further dialogic extension comes from post-colonial perspectives on education. Wa Thiong'o (1986) argued that colonial education systems imposed not only a curriculum but an epistemic framework that rendered Indigenous knowledge invisible and illegitimate. In this light, the equity model's tendency to standardize outcomes around dominant cultural norms can indeed function as a form of epistemic violence even when it aims to include marginalized students. Matusov's uniqueness model offers a genuine alternative by affirming learners' rights to pursue knowledge from within their own cultural and experiential frameworks.

Yet post-colonial scholars such as Chilisa (2012) also insist that community and relationality, not individual autonomy, are the foundations of Indigenous conceptions of knowledge and learning. Ubuntu philosophy, for instance, holds that "a person is a person through other persons" (Tutu, 1999, p. 31), suggesting that the self who learns is always constituted through communal bonds. A uniqueness model that privileges individual self-direction without theorizing how the individual is formed through and responsible to community risks reinstating a liberal-individualist epistemology under a different name, precisely the kind of universalism it seeks to displace.

3.3. The Teacher's Dialogic Role

Finally, I want to raise a question that Matusov's article leaves somewhat underexplored: what is the role of the teacher or, as Matusov (2024) calls them in his recent work, the "fiduciary pedagogue" in the uniqueness model? Matusov describes the student's right to self-education and the teacher's obligation to support rather than impose. But what does this support look like in practice, especially for learners who do not yet know what they want to learn, or who have been so thoroughly "school-intoxicated" (Neill, 1960, p. 22) that they cannot access their own desires?

Hooks (1994, p. 21) offers a vision of "engaged pedagogy" in which teachers do not merely facilitate but bring their whole selves into the educational encounter, their passions, vulnerabilities, and

commitments. This is not paternalism; it is what Buber (2002) called the "I-Thou" relationship, in which both teacher and student are transformed through genuine meeting. The uniqueness model, to be fully developed, needs a richer account of the pedagogical relationship not as the absence of structure, but as the presence of a particular kind of structure: one that is responsive, relational, and oriented toward the student's emergent self-direction.

4. On the Question of Equity's Irreducible Claims

I wish, in closing, to resist any reading of this commentary as a wholesale defense of equity models against Matusov's critique. I share his concern that dominant equity discourse can function to normalize paternalistic control over students' learning under the banner of social justice. The example of the San Francisco Unified School District banning algebra in the name of equity (Matusov, 2026, p. E9) is a cautionary tale worth heeding. And his observation that equity frameworks tend to reward mediocrity only, Coco the Chicken, equally mediocre in everything, graduates with honors, is a sharp and important insight.

Yet I also want to hold onto what is irreducible in equity's concern: that some students, by virtue of historical dispossession, disability, language difference, or material deprivation, face real structural barriers to educational participation that are not simply matters of personal preference or institutional paternalism. These barriers cannot be dissolved by affirming negative liberty. They require affirmative, redistributive intervention. Rawls (1971) argued that inequalities are just only if they benefit the least advantaged members of society. This principle does not mandate standardized outcomes; it mandates attention to the conditions under which diverse educational projects become possible.

The productive tension, then, is not between equity and uniqueness as opposites but as complements in dialectical relation. Equity, reconceived, might mean ensuring that every learner has access to the material, social, and psychological conditions necessary for genuine self-direction. Uniqueness, in turn, means that what learners do with those conditions cannot be prescribed in advance. This is closer to Amartya Sen's (1999) capability approach than to either standard equity models or Matusov's current formulation: the goal is to expand the real freedoms people have to lead lives they have reason to value.

5. Conclusion: An Invitation to Continue the Dialogue

Matusov's "Against Equity" is an important provocation that deserves to be read, argued with, and extended. Its core insight that genuine education requires the learner's authorial agency, self-evaluation, and ownership is philosophically rich and pedagogically urgent. Its critical diagnosis of how equity frameworks can suppress that agency, even in progressive schools, is well-supported by both argument and illustration.

My commentary has sought to open three dialogic fronts: (1) the need for a more robust theory of the structural conditions that make self-education possible; (2) the risk of romanticizing autonomy without attending to its developmental and cultural preconditions; and (3) the possibility of grounding uniqueness in Bakhtinian answerability rather than liberal negative liberty, thereby linking individual self-direction to communal ethical responsibility. I have also proposed that the uniqueness model be understood not as a replacement for equity's concern with structural inequality, but as a reframing of equity's goal: from standardized outcomes to the real capability for self-directed learning.

In the spirit of Matusov's own dialogic pedagogy, I close not with a conclusion but with a question: How might educational institutions from democratic schools to public universities to informal learning communities be designed so that the conditions for genuine self-education are equitably distributed, without

prescribing in advance what that self-education must look like? This, I believe, is the generative horizon that Matusov's work opens, and to which future scholarship in dialogic pedagogy is invited to respond.

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